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We have reached the 200th anniversary of our Constitution. Pre-
dictably, we still argue about its meaning and about the role of the 
judiciary in interpreting it. There are a wide variety of views and often 
heated debates about these questions. Yet, for all the appearance of 
breadth, this debate in its entirety seems out of touch with central 
features of constitutional law and the role of the courts in making it. 
Today's theories of judicial review rely on a variety of images -
judges reasoning toward moral evolution 1 or deliberating civic virtue2 
or discovering higher principles3 or perfecting the process4 or seeking 
and following the plan laid out by the Framers.5 There is grandeur in 
these images. Yet, however attractive, these images belie the struggle 
and reality of human decisionmaking in a complex society. To imag-
ine that the Framers established a detailed plan which modern judges 
can simply discover and apply trivializes the complexity and difficulty 
of making a Constitution. Imagining courts as the central font of na-
tional principles, civic virtue, or moral evolution ignores the severe 
limitations of the judiciary. Deliberation and contemplation, no matter 
how attractive as attributes of individual decisionmaking, fit poorly in 
the much different world of societal decisionmaking. 
It is time for constitutional analysts to form constructs faithful to 
the realities of constitutional decisionmaking. We live in an immense 
and complex society. Our public decisions are made by complicated 
processes in which voters, interest groups, lobbyists, and the press in-
teract with legions of legislators, administrators, and other public 
employees. 
These governmental processes produce countless government deci-
sions. No matter how aggressive the courts or grandiose the constitu-
tional theory only a tiny percentage of these governmental actions can 
ever be seriously reviewed by the judiciary. Whatever the fears of the 
proponents of judicial restraint, the judiciary is a societal deci-
I. See, e.g., Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutio11a/ 
"Interpretation." 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 {1985); Perry, Noni11terpretative Review in Huma11 
Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (1981). 
2. See, e.g., Sunstein, Interest Groups ill American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
3. See, e.g., Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forum of Justice, 93 
HARV. L. REV. l {1979). 
4. See, e.g .• J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
5. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Bork, The Impossibility of 
Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695. 
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sionmaker already severely constrained by its physical limits. Moral 
evolution, discovery of national principles, and the search for civic vir-
tue - whatever those terms mean - are not dominated by the judici-
ary because they cannot be. 6 
Yet, on rare occasions, the federal judiciary plays a significant role 
in societal decisionmaking. These rare occasions define what we call 
constitutional law and are themselves defined by a basic institutional 
choice: the courts decide that they and not some other societal deci-
sionmaker should resolve the substantive issue in question. From this 
vantage point, the study of constitutional law becomes the study of 
this institutional choice, which, in turn, means the study of alternative 
societal decisionmakers, their comparison and matching. The judicial 
role is defined by asking when a constrained and fragile judiciary 
should substitute its decisions for a sometimes badly malfunctioning 
political process. 
The task facing judges is daunting. Before judges ever reach the 
various analyses proposed by most constitutional commentators, they 
already must have made broad-based and sweeping determinations al-
locating most decisions elsewhere. Even among the relatively small 
number of decisions in which judges take preliminary interest, they 
must continuously order and reorder the priorities for the use of their 
limited resources as needs for and strains upon those resources become 
more evident. The judiciary, like other societal institutions, must and 
does make difficult and debatable institutional choices even if judges 
do not always express or even recognize them. The central task for 
constitutional scholars is to make these choices clearer and to help 
judges and others to understand them and make them better. 
This article attempts that task by exploring the elements of institu-
tional choice in constitutional law. Part I takes an overview of the 
general division of decisionmaking responsibility between the political 
processes and the courts. It also examines the failures of existing theo-
ries to take account of this division of responsibility. Part II identifies 
two theories of political malfunction - those circumstances in which 
political processes are subject to significant doubt or distrust and, 
therefore, prime candidates for judicial review. Part III examines the 
characteristics - limits, biases, and abilities - of the judiciary and 
the potential for judicial response to the political malfunctions dis-
6. Physical capacity is not the only limit on judicial activity. Limits on judicial ability and 
institutional power also are important. Physical limits are not easily defined and are subject to 
complex interactions with considerations of judicial ability and the tractability of the societal 
issue involved. These questions will be considered in Part III.A infra. 
My point here is that considering only physical limits, the judiciary cannot shoulder the 
heroic tasks suggested by these theories. This point is explored further in Part I infra. 
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cussed earlier. It explains why various forms of judicial response are 
more appropriate for some types of political malfunction than for 
others. The result is an overview of judicial response which provides 
insights into what constitutional law is and can be. 7 
This article and two previous ones show that institutional analysis 
is essential but largely ignored in present constitutional scholarship. 8 
This article confronts the task of building such an analysis, a task 
complicated by a number of factors. Lack of data and of existing dis-
course means that identifying the relevant characteristics of the key 
decisionmakers and matching their relative abilities with given societal 
issues is treacherous, and that applications of the theory to specific 
constitutional questions must too often be based on impressions and 
intuitions. The task is also complicated by the inevitable interplay be-
tween the choice of institutions and the choice of societal goals. Insti-
tutional function and malfunction must be defined in terms of some set 
of goals. In turn, whether any set of goals is sensible, attainable, or 
attractive depends on how it operates through real world institutions. 
In order to show the importance of institutional analysis, this arti-
cle inevitably makes assumptions about institutional abilities and soci-
etal goals. Many of the more controversial choices are considered at 
length in the body of the article.9 I have found the particular concep-
tions of institutional failure and comparison presented here, as approx-
imate and rough as they are, very useful in understanding 
constitutional law, history, and commentary. But these particular 
conceptions are secondary. I am primarily interested in showing that 
careful analysis of institutional choice is essential for any constitu-
tional theory no matter what its underlying perception of societal 
7. The proposed analysis is used here for both positive (descriptive) and normative (prescrip-
tive) purposes. Institutional forces are powerful enough that they force their way into judicial 
opinions and decisions. As such, institutional analysis is important in understanding what judges 
say and do. That does not mean, however, that the institutional analysis and choices made by 
judges are always or even usually above criticism. Therefore, institutional analysis enters into 
criticism and prescription as well as description and prediction. 
8. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Anal-
ysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 366 (1984) [hereinafter Taking Institutions Seriously]; Komesar, Back to 
the Future-An Institutional View of Making and Interpreting Constitutions, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
191 (1987) (hereinafter Back to the Future]. 
9. For the purposes of this article, for example, I have defined institutional function and 
malfunction in terms of the representation of the interests, desires, and preferences of the people. 
I am aware that such a choice of goals is unattractive to many analysts. Indeed, on some levels 
of analysis it is unattractive to me. As I explain in the body of the article, this specification of 
goals is, in part, the product of the inability of those who oppose preference to articulate alterna-
tive definitions of goals, let alone their institutional implications. Respect for citizen desires has 
important claims for a place in any definition of societal goals. Whatever its failings as a com· 
plete definition, I believe it serves sufficiently for present purposes. This subject is more fully 
explored in Part 11.C infra. 
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goals, and that such an analysis must pay serious attention to basic 
features like physical resources and institutional size, the complexities 
of aggregate or collective decisionmaking, and the comparative nature 
of institutional choice. In this vein, the particular analytical concep-
tions and applications which follow are not meant to be the last word 
on the subject. Quite the opposite, they are meant to open the inquiry. 
I. BASIC CONTEXTS 
Before turning to an examination of the political process and the 
judiciary as alternative decisionmakers, we must briefly describe two 
contexts which are basic to the analysis which follows. The first is the 
institutional context - an overview of the division of responsibility 
between the judiciary and the political process. The second is the in-
tellectual context - a brief review of the scholarly approaches to con-
stitutional analysis. These two contexts are related and the failings of 
many theories lie in their incompatibility with the simple and noncon-
troversial overview of societal decisionmaking presented here.10 
Very few governmental decisions have any serious potential for ju-
dicial scrutiny. Even at the height of the era of economic due process 
- the era of the greatest, or at least the broadest, judicial activism -
only a tiny fraction of governmental action was actually subject to se-
rious judicial review let alone at risk of invalidation. As a general 
matter, the courts pose no threat to most governmental resolutions of 
societal issues. 
This limited judicial role is often ascribed to the questionable legiti-
macy of judicial dominance in a democracy. Evaluation of this com-
mon theme requires some subtlety. The terms of the Constitution and 
the writings surrounding its framing reveal considerable distrust of de-
mocracy and majoritarianism on the part of the Framers11 - a dis-
trust which played an important role in the construction of our 
Constitution and which, in turn, is central in the analysis of political 
malfunction which follows. Yet consistent with the theme of this arti-
cle, the Framers were faced with constrained institutional choices and, 
in the end, they chose democratic forms even though they encumbered 
this democracy with skewed patterns of representation, screened it by 
elite electors, and balanced and checked it by various branches and 
10. The critique of existing theories presented here is a brief review of the critiques presented 
previously in Taking Institutions Seriously, supra note 8, and Back to the Future, supra note 8. 
The critiques of the searchers for principles and fundamental rights can be found in Taking 
Institutions Seriously, supra note 8, at 425-40, and in Back to the Future, supra note 8, at 210-16. 
The critique of Ely's theory can be found in Taking Institutions Seriously, supra note 8, at 398-
425. The critique of the originalists can be found in Back to the Future, supra note 8, at 194-210. 
11. See Part 11.D infra. 
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levels of decisionmaking. As such, majoritarianism remained and re-
mains an essential component of our Constitution. The significant 
weight given majoritarianism by Framers who understood and feared 
its dangers makes judicial dominance an uncomfortable proposition. 12 
Beyond arguments about legitimacy, however, judicial dominance 
of societal decisionmaking is simply physically impossible. It boggles 
the mind to even imagine the judiciary seriously examining all govern-
mental action. Government (aside from the judiciary) has grown 
much faster than the judiciary.13 Massive long-term governmental 
12. Majoritarianism can take several meanings here. In general, it simply means majority 
rule - by one more than half. But it can refer to larger necessary majorities such as the two-
thirds or three-quarters requirements which occasionally surface in the Constitution. 
In theoretical work on collective decisionmaking, the term majority is really anything less 
than unanimity. In the field of public choice, a crossover between political science and econom-
ics, there has been a great deal of work done on the positive (descriptive) and normative (pre-
scriptive) implications of less than unanimous collective choice mechanisms (majoritarianism). 
As a general matter, majoritarianism is always faced with the danger of cycling or intransivity. 
This means that choice A can be preferred to choice B and B to C without it necessarily meaning 
thatA will be chosen over C. Such cycling presents problems for the translation of citizen prefer-
ence into collective action because it means that choice can be governed by how the issue is posed 
to the collective decisionmaker. In our example, A may win if paired with B but lose if paired 
with C although B would win if paired with C. Cycling and its normative implications for collec-
tive choice is the core of the famous Arrow Impossibility Theorem. See generally K. ARROW, 
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). The implications of cycling, both 
normative and positive, are nicely laid out in Dennis Mueller's excellent summary of public 
choice theory, D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979). 
The possibility of cycling is disturbing in a nonunanimous system and raises questions, at 
least in theory, about the reliance on nonunanimous collective choice inherent in our societal 
preference for majoritarianism. For present purposes, we can escape this quandary by taking as 
given the present system with its significant reliance on nonunanimous choice (majoritarianism). 
Any analysis of judicial review, as apposed to global constitutional reform, would have to take 
such a situation as given. 
But, even if we were to move to the rarified world of global reform, majoritarianism would in 
all likelihood prevail at least for a large and complex society. Majoritarianism is flawed, but the 
alternatives - unanimity or dictatorship - seem worse. In particular, unanimity is unattainable 
in most instances. Indeed if it were unattainable for even a small percentage of societal decisions 
and nonunanimous choice had to be allowed in, such nonunanimous choice would quickly spread 
unless there was some way to specify property rights or other designations of those areas which 
were off limits to majoritarianism. As I have argued elsewhere, such initial specifications are 
highly unlikely if not impossible in real world constitution-making. See Back to the Future, supra 
note 8, at 198-99. We will return to this theme when we examine the "civic virtue" analysts. See 
Part 11.C infra. 
As a general matter, majoritarianism is an inherent part of our collective decisionmaking and 
would likely be so even if we opened the scope of inquiry to global constitutional reform. The 
issue here is the role of nonmajoritarian (less majoritarian) mechanisms like the judiciary in a 
system which is largely if sometimes uncomfortably built on majoritarianism. 
13. In 1980 the total expenditure of the federal judiciary was about $564 million. See FISCAL 
SERVICE, BUREAU OF GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL OPERATIONS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, 
TREASURY COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS, EXPENDITURES AND BALANCES OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 13 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 U.S. ACCOUNTS]. While the data in 
1980 U.S. AccouNTS makes it difficult to calculate administrative costs for Congress, the execu-
tive branch, and the federal administrative agencies, a conservative estimate yields a figure in 
excess of $94 billion - over 160 times the budget for the judiciary. See id. at 110-24, 132-508. 
In 1925, the analogous figures were approximately $19 million for the judiciary, see DIVISION OF 
BOOKKEEPING AND WARRANTS, U.S. TREASURY DEPT., COMBINED STATEMENT OF THE RE· 
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programs like national defense, welfare, criminal justice, and educa-
tion are administered by enormous agencies that employ millions of 
people. These programs produce reviewable action at a virtually un-
countable rate. 14 The physical capacity of the courts to review govern-
mental action is simply dwarfed by the capacity of governments to 
produce such action.1s 
A central role for majoritarian decisionmaking and the severe lim-
its on judicial resources do not, however, preclude a serious or impor-
tant judicial role. The judiciary has the resources with which to 
review a significant, if relatively small, subset of governmental deci-
sions and has done so especially in the past century. Our affection for 
democratic forms has been tempered throughout our history with 
CElPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS BALANCES, ETC., OF THE UNITED STATES 131 (1925) [hereinafter 
1925 U.S. AccouNTS], and $424 million for the political branches, see id. at 40-253, the latter 
approximately twenty-two times the size of the former. In other words, the administrative 
budget of the political branches had grown more than seven times as fast as the budget of the 
judiciary. 
Although the most dramatic source of the difference is the growth in administrative agency 
budgets, compare 1980 U.S. AccouNTS, supra, at 140-508, with 1925 U.S. ACCOUNTS, supra, at 
49-253, even the figures for Congress and the executive proper dwarf those for the courts. In 
1980, that figure was over $1.25 billion, or more than twice the judicial budget. See 1980 U.S. 
AccouNTS, supra, at 110-24, 132-38. In 1925, the budget for the federal judiciary (excluding 
expenditures for penal institutions) was only about thirty percent less than the administrative 
budget for Congress and the executive. See 1925 U.S. ACCOUNTS, supra, at 47-48, 131. 
14. For example, the number oflaws passed in a session provides some measure oflegislative 
activity by federal and state governments. During the 98th Congress, 623 Public Laws were 
passed. CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., CALENDARS OF 
THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND HISTORY OF LEGISLATION 19-53 
(1983). Approximately 70,000 bills were enacted by the fifty states during the 1983-1985 legisla-
tive sessions. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 114-20 
(1986-1987) (sum of the numbers in the tables therein). No similar compilation of data exists for 
local governments. 
No complete measure of federal administrative activity is available, although the number of 
documents published annually in the Federal Register for incorporation into the Code of Federal 
Regulations provides some indication offederal rulemaking capacity. In 1986, 4,589 documents 
were published (5,154 in 1984 and 4,853 in 1985). Telephone interview with Internal Records 
Office, Federal Register, National Archives (June 1987). The quantity of state and local adminis-
trative regulations has not been reported. The number of informal, reviewable decisions by fed-
eral, state, and local agencies is unknown but probably "runs in the hundreds of millions or 
billions annually." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 8 (1975). 
15. For some indication of the strains of broad-based judicial review consider the discussion 
of the era of economic due process in Part Ill.A infra. 
Of course, if one imagined that the judiciary could deal with vast sets of issues by some simple 
sweeping solution, physical capacity would not seem such a limit. Some types of issues may be 
more tractable- conducive to sweeping solutions. We will discuss the interaction between tract-
ability and judicial response subsequently. See Part III.A infra. It is, however, a flight of fancy 
to imagine that the judiciary can issue broad maxims that would suffice as serious judicial review 
of the vast, diverse, and complex mass that is governmental decisionmaking. 
There is, of course, no fixed limit on the size of the federal judiciary. The difficulties ascribed 
to physical limits might be swept away by increasing the size of the judiciary. But, given the tasks 
of review described previously, that increase would have to be very dramatic to negate the gen-
eral point that physical limits are important in understanding constitutional law. Such changes 
seem such a remote possibility that they are ignored here. 
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fears and doubts. As we shall see, variations in the strain on judicial 
resources and the degree of doubt about the political processes help 
define the small subset of issues in which the judiciary will dominate. 
The picture of societal decisionmaking presented here is simple: 
The political process is the dominant decisionmaker; the judiciary oc-
casionally dominates, but is usually dormant. 16 I have not yet at-
tempted to describe Qet alone prescribe) the borders between the small 
enclaves of judicial activism and the larger terrain of judicial passiv-
ism. Virtually all constitutional observers would have to agree with 
this loose description of judicial activity. It also seems loose enough to 
command general acceptance even as prescription. Judicial activity 
could be increased to include the tasks desired by the most activist 
legal commentator without violating this picture. 
Yet, many existing theories of judicial review are based on concep-
tions which are inconsistent with even this simple picture. These theo-
ries often envision the judiciary as the institution entrusted with the 
revelation and protection of long-term principles, and public values. 17 
But public values, moral issues, and principles are implicated in all 
important societal issues, and do not differentiate among societal is-
sues in any way which would define a set of issues for the judiciary to 
decide. If the courts are the major arbiters of public values, moral 
concerns, and basic principles and these are present for all important 
societal issues, the judiciary must dominate societal decisionmaking, 
with a minor and undefined role assigned the political process. Such a 
position violates the simple overview presented earlier. 
A variant of the "searcher for principle" role - the "protector of 
' fundamental rights or values" role - has found its way into constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Judges are enamored of the notion of "funda-
mental rights." They tell us that if legislation impinges on these 
rights, then strict scrutiny is applied. 18 This support from the judici-
ary has in tum promoted great interest in "fundamentalness" on the 
16. Throughout this article, I contrast the judiciary with the political process. This division 
is meant to reflect the distinction between reviewer and reviewed. In that sense, the political 
process includes executive, legislative, and administrative decisionmakers at the federal, state, 
and local levels (and even state courts). I do not mean to suggest that all of these various 
processes are identical in such attributes as their tendency to malfunction or the form of malfunc-
tion. The relevant issue will always be the characteristics of that portion of the political process 
whose decision is under review. Nor do I mean to suggest that the judiciary is not, from some 
vantage points, part of the political process. The analysis here is concerned with judicial review, 
and for those purposes the judiciary stands in contrast to the rest of the political process whose 
actions it reviews. 
17. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 23-28 (1962); Hart, Tlte 
Supreme Court, 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time Cltart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 
(1959); Fiss, supra note 3, at 5-17. 
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
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part of scholars.19 
The concept, however, cannot be taken seriously as a means of 
defining the judicial role. In its most direct form, it defines a judicial 
role which clearly violates the basic divisions of societal decisionmak-
ing set out previously. If fundamental means important or basic, then 
the doctrine would give the most central societal decisionmaking to 
the judiciary, not the legislature. In a complex and vast society like 
ours, that would likely mean that the judiciary would operate on a 
scale way beyond its existing physical capacity and with an authority 
totally inconsistent with our basic notions.20 
The image of the judiciary as the determiner of fundamental values 
or long-term principles, a favorite among judges and commentators, 
simply does not fit the task for which it is most often used: defining 
the role of judicial review. The central theme of this article is that this 
role can only be defined by considering the relative ability of the courts 
and the political process to resolve societal issues, a difficult task. 
Two alternative theories exist, however, which suggest shortcuts to 
this difficult task. First, John Ely's theory of judicial review allocates 
decisionmaking by simply dividing societal issues into two types -
process and substance - and allocating process issues to the judiciary 
and substance issues to the political process. Ely strongly criticizes 
fundamental rights analyses like the ones just discussed for calling 
upon the courts to make basic societal value judgments. 21 According 
to Ely, these value judgments are the business of the political process. 
The judiciary's only task is to make sure that political decisionmakers 
abide by the rules of the game. Courts must enforce these rules of the 
game because the players (the legislators) cannot police themselves.22 
The courts should concern themselves with the process of making 
value judgments, not with the value judgments themselves. Ely's iden-
tification of two separate spheres facilitates a simple institutional allo-
cation of societal issues: render unto the political process that which is 
19. See, e.g., Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). 
20. It is quite clear that the courts actually use the term fundamental in ways unrelated to 
any common sense meaning. The Supreme Court's list of fundamental subjects excludes many of 
the most important in any society. Omitted are not only education, housing, and basic suste-
nance, but also peace and war, environmental concerns, and, in general, the use of most of those 
resources (material and human) that seem crucial to our welfare - societal or individual. The 
Supreme Court has made clear that societal importance is not the bench mark of what is "funda-
mental" - a message not very difficult to read into the observed pattern of their decisions. The 
use of fundamental rights in constitutional jurisprudence is examined and critiqued in Part 
III.B.2 infra. 
21. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 43-72. 
22. See id. at 101-03. 
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the political process' (substance) and render unto the courts that 
which is the courts' (process). 
But this neat split of issues with its underlying idea that judicial 
review can take place without judicial value judgments is based on a 
basic misconception.23 It reflects a recurrent theme that the decisions 
made by courts and legislatures are somehow different. It may be that 
courts and legislatures - or more broadly, the judiciary and the polit-
ical process - decide differently. Indeed this. article supposes that 
they do. But that does not mean that they operate on different issues. 
Judicial review is judicial reconsideration of an issue already decided 
by another societal decisionmaker. When that reconsideration leads 
to invalidation of the governmental action, the courts are remaking 
social policy. Courts are operating as alternative societal 
decisionmakers. 
Ely's belief that reaction to problems in the political process should 
be important in defining the judicial role is one I share. But judicial 
concern about political malfunction does not free the judiciary from 
having to make societal decisions and, therefore, basic value judg-
ments. Political malfunction only defines one element in the allocation 
of societal decisionmaking. An adequate analysis of this allocation 
also requires consideration of the ability of the judiciary to make (or 
remake) these societal decisions. The issues Ely terms "process" may 
have special attraction for the courts because their correct determina-
tion improves the political process. But these issues like any other 
societal issues demand value judgments and, therefore, pose questions 
about relative institutional ability which cannot be resolved by Ely's 
simple dichotomy.24 
Originalism offers a second "easy way" around the difficulties of 
institutional choice. According to originalism, no one in the present 
generation needs to choose among societal decisionmakers since those 
choices were already made by the Framers. There is, of course, the 
institutional choice whether to be bound by the decisions of the Fram-
ers or to remake that decision now. Much of the debate about 
originalism involves the question of whether the original intent should 
be followed. But that debate is largely pointless. 
On virtually all important issues of institutional choice or substan-
tive results, the Constitution and the intent of the Framers remain 
23. There are several problems with Ely's analysis. These problems, along with the virtues of 
Ely's approach, are discussed in Taking Institutions Seriously, supra note 8, at 398-425. Other 
aspects of Ely's theory are considered in Part 11.C infra. 
24. This issue is considered at length in Part 111.B.1 infra. 
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equivocal. 25 The brief text of the Constitution offers little detail on 
institutional allocation; most of the detailed provisions of the Consti-
tution concern institutional design. Nor will an examination of the 
surrounding records yield unequivocal results. 
Answers from the past are unavailable for many reasons. The lo-
gistics of record keeping and the identification of relevant views among 
conflicting statements provide problems. Problems in the use of lan-
guage, no doubt tempered by the Framers' desire not to bind future 
generations unnecessarily, also led to equivocal results.26 Perhaps 
most important, constitution framing in the American experience is a 
collective enterprise. The original Constitution was the product of 
group decisionmaking - the Philadelphia Convention and the state 
ratifying conventions. In turn, the Civil War amendments were the 
product of Congress and the state legislatures. Collective intent is ex-
tremely difficult if not impossible to define, let alone unequivocally es-
tablish in a particular instance. Like the analysis of other large 
processes, the analysis of constitution framing, an example of aggre-
gate decisionmaking, forecloses simple extrapolation from individual 
decisionmaking and harbors the possibility for counterintuitive re-
sults. 27 Despite the continuous assertion that original intent dictates 
results, careful analysis indicates otherwise. 
There are no simple shortcuts around the difficult questions sur-
rounding the allocation of societal decisionmaking. By a gradual pro-
cess of accretion, the federal judiciary has acquired an increasingly 
significant role in this allocation. The rest of this article attempts to 
construct an analytical framework capable of understanding and im-
proving these allocative decisions which form the core of constitu-
tional law. The analysis builds on themes which have already surfaced 
such as the importance of resource constraints and the degree of dis-
trust of popular government. 
The formulation proposed here is, in concept, quite simple. Judges 
should, and to a significant extent do, consider the relative ability of 
the political process and the judicial process to resolve the societal 
issue in question. Because so much must be left with the political pro-
cess, a heavy presumption of control by the political process will inevi-
25. This subject is considered at length in Back to the Future, supra note 8, at 194-210. The 
treatment here is a brief recap of that analysis. 
26. Such problems of language are discussed in Back to the Future, supra note 8, at 198-203. 
27. Prominent among these is the possibility of cycling discussed earlier. See note 12 supra. 
Such occurrences throw substantial doubt even on some of the most substantially documented 
assertions of original intent. See Back to the Future, supra note 8, at 203-10 (examining Raoul 
Berger's assertions about the fourteenth amendment). 
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tably result. One consideration in overcoming this presumption is the 
d~gree of malfunction in the political process. 
The existence and severity of political malfunction, however, is 
only part of the institutional balance which defines judicial review. 
The issue is the relative ability of the judiciary to rework the societal 
issues involved, requiring us to scrutinize the judicial alternative also. 
Like the analysis of the political process, the analysis of the judiciary 
must recognize the systemic character of the adjudicative process. In 
the rest of this article I will construct a theory of political malfunction 
and match it with the potential for judicial response. 
II. POLITICAL MALFUNCTION 
Theories of political malfunction should be able to integrate those 
features of political decisionmaking which have traditionally troubled 
people, and be sophisticated enough to recognize the complexity of 
decisionmaking in our society. They must be simple and intuitively 
appealing without totally suppressing complexity and the existence of 
counterintuitive features. The two simple conceptions presented here 
capture basic impressions of political malfunction common both today 
and throughout our constitutional history. Yet they also comprehend 
the systemic nature of societal decisionmaking, which goes beyond the 
intentions, purposes, or desires (good or evil) of government officials to 
recognize a complex variety of interactions between these officials and 
the general populace or subgroups (constituencies) within that 
populace. 
A. The Spectrum and the Poles: Fear of the Many 
and Fear of the Few 
Two visions of political malfunction - one stressing fear of the 
many and the other stressing fear of the few - coexist in our tradi-
tional views of government. At various times and by various parties, 
one or the other of these conceptions has been envisioned as the sole or 
paramount evil. In fact, however, both conceptions are viable repre-
sentations of serious political malfunction applicable to different but 
important instances of political decisionmaking. These polar concep-
tions and their different spheres of relevance form the core of the the-
ory of political malfunction employed here.28 
Recent scholarship by John Ely and Bruce Ackerman about the 
28. I refer to the conception of political malfunction which stresses the undue influence of the 
majority at the expense of the minority as "majoritarian bias" and the conception which stresses 
the undue influence of the minority at the expense of the majority as "minoritarian bias." 
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famous Carolene Products footnote underscores the importance of 
both of these polar conceptions as well as the conflict between them. 
United States v. Carolene Products Co. 29 was one of a set of cases 
which marked the end' of the era of economic due process and ushered 
in the modern trend of easy validation of economic regulation. The 
case is most important, however, not for what it decided - that a 
federal ban on the sale of milk substitute was valid - but because of 
what it announced it had not decided. In footnote four, the Court 
declared that it was not deciding to retire from serious judicial review 
of all types of legislation;30 Legislatures may be given wider leeway 
but they were not given carte blanche. 
In the third paragraph of the footnote, the Court expressed special 
concern about statutes where "prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail 
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon 
to protect minorities."31 In his theory of judicial review discussed ear-
lier, John Ely hews closely to the position of the Carolene Products 
Court. 32 He uses the conditions set out in the footnote to define mal-
function of the political process and with it the role of constitutional 
judicial review. His approach echoes strongly the Court's concern 
about the treatment of "discrete and insular minorities." 
In a recent article, Bruce Ackerman argued that this conception of 
legislative malfunction, if it ever correctly captured the dominant form 
29. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
30. Footnote four reads: 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as 
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be em-
braced within the Fourteenth. 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political 
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, 
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the 
right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 297 U.S. 233; on re-
straints upon the dissemination of information, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 
697, 713-714, 718-720, 722; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233; Lovell v. Griffin, 
supra; on interferences with political organizations, see Stromberg v. California, supra, 369; 
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-378; Herndon v. 
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242; and see Holmes, J., in Git/ow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673; as to 
prohibition of peaceable assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365. 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes 
directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities; or whether prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail 
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, 
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 
304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (some citations omitted). 
31. 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
32. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 73-104. 
670 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:657 
of legislative malfunction, fails to do so now.33 In his view, the insu-
larity and discreteness which characterizes racial and religious minori-
ties has become a political virtue allowing these groups to more easily 
organize and influence political decisions. Thus, he contends that to-
day judicial concern should shift to nondiscrete and noninsular groups 
where dispersion and assimilation make organization and adequate 
representation difficult. In particular, Ackerman points to such 
groups as women and the poor. Ackerman's theory represents a well-
articulated alternative to such Carolene Products-based theories as that 
of John Ely. 
Although there are serious problems with both Ackerman's and 
Ely's analyses, 34 the work of these two constitutional scholars high-
lights the ongoing significance of these two polar conceptions of polit-
ical malfunction and the tension between them. This tension between 
33. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985). 
34. The form of political malfunction Ackerman articulates is much broader and much older 
than he indicates. The overrepresentation of concentrated minorities was a major concern in the 
framing of the Constitution, in the Jacksonian era, and in the post-Civil War period. See note 53 
infra. This concern was influential in shaping judicial review during the era of economic due 
process where there was significant judicial distrust of legislation like that considered in Carolene 
Products (the case, not the footnote). Indeed the classic example of a dispersed and unorganized 
group is consumers, who are damaged by a political bias in favor of those well-organized minori-
ties of producers we have come to call special interests. 
The unseen lineage and breadth of this form of political malfunction seriously reduces the 
cogency of Ackerman's position on judicial review. For example, he extols the wisdom of the 
Carolene Products Court in breaking from the era of economic due process. This position is the 
shared gospel of virtually all modem constitutional scholars: the era of economic due process 
was bad. Yet this bad era focused at least part of its attention on special interest legislation. 
When that era ended and a greater presumption of constitutionality was reestablished, the 
change provided a great deal more breathing room for the very bias which concerns Ackerman. 
See J. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 74-75 (1977). The potential 
for overrepresentation of discrete minorities in the form of special interest legislation remains 
high today. The conception of the legislative process Ackerman points to in asserting that 
women and the poor need greater protection also means that consumers and taxpayers need even 
greater protection. 
I am not asserting that women and the poor do not have special claims for protection or that 
if they are to be given a special place we must return to the era of economic due process. We will 
consider that subject later in the article. I am asserting that a theory of judicial review based 
solely on a conception of political malfunction which stresses the problems of dispersion and lack 
of organization will not provide the route to the positions Ackerman advocates. Even if the 
theory of political malfunction Ackerman proposes were better tailored to achieve the results he 
seeks, however, it would be problematic because it is based solely on the existence of political 
malfunction. As such it, like Ely's theory, is single institutional rather than comparative institu-
tional. A complete institutional analysis requires that we also consider the limits on the judici-
ary. As we shall see, variation in the ability of the judiciary rather than political malfunction 
explains the stronger case for gender relative to economic due process. Analysis of judicial abil-
ity also helps explain why, despite the seriousness of bias against dispersed majorities, judicial 
review does and should remain concerned with protection of discrete and insular minorities. As 
we shall see, there are also reasons to envision the political malfunction associated with gender 
and poverty as quite different. See Part 111.B.2 infra. 
The problems with Ely's theory have been discussed at length in Taking Institutions Seri· 
ously, supra note 8, at 398-425. Other aspects have been considered in Part I supra, and will be 
considered in Part 11.C infra. 
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majoritarian bias and minoritarian bias provides a way to understand 
our constitutional tradition by exposing the character of distrust of the 
political process at any given time and over time. Neither of these 
polar forms of political malfunction dominates all times or all aspects 
of any one time. That these conceptions of political malfunction have 
both a long history and an intuitive appeal today warns against elimi-
nating either characterization from institutional analysis. Ackerman 
and Ely fail to understand this. This article will focus on those factors 
which make one or the other of these forms of malfunction more likely 
in a given setting. The ensuing sections examine these conceptions, 
their basic settings, their traditions and history, and their parameters 
and determinants. 
B. The Spectrum: A Closer Look at the Definition of the Polar 
Conceptions and a Search for Determinants 
When de Tocqueville used the phrase "tyranny of the majority" or 
Madison spoke of the deleterious effect of majoritarian factions, they 
did not explain the mechanics of these evils. Although we can sense 
the problems inherent in suggestive phrases like tyranny of the major-
ity or special interest legislation, it is not as easy to spell out those 
elements which define, let alone produce, these skewed allocations of 
influence. 35 What constitutes majoritarian or minoritarian bias? 
When is it more likely that we will have majoritarian rather than mi-
noritarian bias? This section explores these questions beginning with a 
brief description of minoritarian and majoritarian bias, which relates 
both forms of malfunction to the same skewed distribution of impacts 
or effects. It then examines the factors which make one or the other of 
these biases more likely. 
1. Minoritarian and Majoritarian Bias Defined 
Minoritarian bias supposes an inordinate power of the few at the 
expense of the many. The power of these few stems from better access 
to the seats of power through personal influence, organization, infor-
mation, or sophistication. In our society, influence can be gained by 
identifying important political figures and delivering what those polit-
ical figures want. The terms of trade may be as crass as graft or as 
innocent as information. Honest public servants commonly lack the 
information they need for decisionmaking. Educating these deci-
sionmakers is a route to influence. Elected officials can also be influ-
35. Since 1980, over fifty law review articles have employed some variant of the phrase "tyr-
anny of the majority." None define it. 
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enced by promises of campaign contributions or threats of negative 
media. 
Graft, propaganda, and political support take organization and re-
sources. Here a majority, each of whose members suffers only a small 
loss from a government action, can be at a significant disadvantage to 
a minority with large per capita gains. If the per capita loss is low 
enough, members of this majority may not even recognize it. Envision 
a social program which would produce ten million dollars in benefits 
spread over ten individuals but which imposed one hundred million 
dollars in losses spread over ten million people. Though total costs 
easily outstrip total benefits, it is entirely plausible that the program 
would be implemented without opposition. The loss is so small per 
capita that members of the majority may lack the incentive even to 
recognize the existence of the legislation, or that they may be harmed 
by it. 
Even if a member of the majority knows of the proposed legislation 
and recognizes its dangers, the low personal stakes limit the motiva-
tion to expend resources aimed at influencing the outcome. Each indi-
vidual has small incentive to spend time or money in organizing the 
efforts of others. Such efforts are further frustrated by the limited like-
lihood that other members of the majority will respond. These other 
members may not recognize the dangers in the proposed legislation, 
and therefore expenditures must be made to educate them. If they do 
understand, they will be inclined to "free ride": they may refuse to 
contribute supposing that others will carry the load. When free riding 
becomes pervasive, no one contributes and the position goes unrepre-
sented. In tum, the prospect that others will free ride and the expendi-
ture of resources necessary to overcome it may well discourage any. 
efforts to activate the dormant majority.36 
Majoritarian bias can be defined as an opposite response to the 
same skewed distribution of impacts which characterized minoritarian 
bias. The difference lies in our suppositions about the political pro-
cess. If we suppose that everyone understands and votes their interests 
then, in a political process which counts votes for or against but which 
does not consider the severity of impact or the intensity of feeling 
about the issue, a low-impact majority can prevail over a high-impact 
minority even though the majority will gain little and the minority is 
harmed greatly. The power of the many lies simply in their numbers 
and the bias arises because the few are disproportionately harmed. 
36. See generally M. OISON, THE Lome OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
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2. Determinants of Bias 
These two quite different conceptions of the political process dis-
play two quite different modes of influence. Greater organization is 
the political advantage of the group with more concentrated impacts; 
more votes is the political advantage of the group with more dispersed 
impacts. Both biases seem to share a common context - a skewed 
distribution of impacts. The same distribution of impacts (small per 
capita on one side and large per capita on the other) can cause severe 
problems of vastly different sorts depending on the assumptions one 
makes about the workings of the political process. Different settings 
or contexts have different potential for these biases. In this section, we 
examine those factors which make one bias more likely than the other. 
a. Information, organization, and the choice of bias. The costs of 
obtaining information about relevant issues and the costs of organizing 
efforts to influence government decisions are important in determining 
the likelihood of a given bias. Factors which increase information or 
organization costs make minoritarian bias more likely. Factors which 
decrease information and organization costs increase the chance of 
majoritarian bias. For example, more information and sophistication 
is necessary to recognize, understand, and address more complex is-
sues. In this connection, continuing or long-term exposure to an issue 
provides an advantage. Those who have dealt with an issue often ac-
quire information and sophistication which the recently exposed must 
now obtain. 
The experience necessary to identify and react to social issues does 
not always or even usually emanate from a careful, calculated immer-
sion in a subject. Basic cultural institutions such as religious and eth-
nic associations provide common background which make some 
societal distinctions or issues more familiar. Basic divisions and dis-
tinctions like ethnicity, race, and gender evolve into simple symbols 
which, in tum, create easy association and interest in issues directly 
involving them. These simple symbols and associations provide basic 
building blocks for cognition which make attempts to inform or organ-
ize a group easier. 
The importance of information underscores the power and impor-
tance of the media. In a society with a growing population and ever 
more complex and changing technology, the influence of the media 
increases. Issues flagged by the media or by public figures who gain 
the attention of the media are issues about which the public has "easy 
access." Media attention and political malfunction can interact in a 
number of ways. Media manipulated by concentrated interests be-
674 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:657 
comes just another channel for minoritarian bias. On the other hand, 
investigative reporting which uncovers information hidden from the 
general public by politicians or special interests helps correct mi-
noritarian bias. Easy availability of information to a majority who 
would not otherwise understand an issue or even perceive its relevance 
to them severely lessens the probability of minoritarian bias. 37 
Effective influence also requires understanding the process of influ-
ence itself. Some government processes are more accessible than 
others. The larger the number of decisionmakers, the more complex 
their procedures, and the more physically remote they are, the more 
difficult it is to understand how the process of influence works and the 
more expensive it is to use it. High-paid, professional lobbyists have 
knowledge and contacts which they sell to those who wish to influence 
the process. Less accessible processes require more expertise and, in 
turn, stress the need for organization and the pooling of funds in order 
to accumulate or purchase this expertise. 38 
The important element here is the degree of complexity, under-
standing, and access and, in turn, the degree of advantage for concen-
trated interests. This advantage varies with subject matter, 
jurisdiction, and the characteristics of the decisionmaker. The more 
the general public understands and the more accessible the process of 
influence, the less the advantage of concentrated over dispersed inter-
ests. As the advantage of concentrated groups lessens and dispersed 
groups increases, we see a trade-off between the danger of minoritarian 
bias and the danger of majoritarian bias. 
b. Mixed biases and the case of the catalytic subgroup. We have 
thus far treated the majority as though each member had the same per 
capita impact. Dropping this assumption reveals an important poten-
tial ingredient in activating the majority. Subgroups within the other-
wise low per capita majority may have per capita impact high enough 
to provide members of this subgroup with sufficient incentive to edu-
cate and activate the less interested members of the majority. A con-
centrated subgroup capable of awakening the dormant majority has a 
potent source of political clout unavailable even to better informed, 
organized, and funded minorities - the threat of a majoritarian upris-
ing. Whether and to what extent such a subgroup can actually activate 
the majority depends on the factors we have already discussed. In es-
37. We will return to the role of the media in the correction or aggravation of political mal-
function in our consideration of the role of first amendment protection. See Part 111.B.1 infra. 
38. As we shall see, conflict over such structural elements which determined the accessibility 
offederal political officials fueled the debates over the original Constitution. See Part 11.C infra. 
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sence, the concentrated subgroup operates as a catalyst increasing the 
probability of activating the majority. 
3. Majoritarian Bias and the Characteristics of Protected Minorities 
Significant judicial concern about mistreatment o( politically weak 
minorities, foreshadowed in the Carolene Products footnote discussed 
previously, surfaces in modem equal protection law with its focus on 
well-defined racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. A similar concern 
for politically disadvantaged minorities is patent in the notion of 
majoritarian bias employed in this article. But the criteria used by the 
courts to define the need for minority protection - discreteness, insu-
larity, 39 and immutability4<> - appear quite different from the charac-
teristics of majoritarian bias stressed here - an active majority and a 
disproportionately harmed minority. Despite initial appearances, 
however, strong links exist between those characteristics traditionally 
stressed by the courts and the likelihood of severe majoritarian bias as 
defined in this article. Although a full examination of the judicial 
treatment of minorities must wait until we have more fully explored 
the limits and potentials of the judiciary, exploration of these links 
here provides a better understanding of the conceptions of political 
malfunction just presented. 
Given the skewed distribution of impacts, the more discrete, insu-
lar, and immutable the minority, the more likely the existence of a 
stable majority willing to suppress the minority. Because majoritarian 
bias supposes large per capita costs for the minority with much lower 
per capita benefits for the majority, slipping into minority status car-
ries dire results. In such a situation, members of the majority would 
want to feel secure that the significant negative impacts of this govern-
ment action did not apply to them. To reassure members of the ma-
jority, the disadvantaged minority would have to be clearly defined. 
In other words, these minorities would have to be safe targets. 
Discrete, insular, and immutable minorities are safe targets. By 
definition, discrete groups are easily delimited and identified - per-
haps even physically identifiable. The clear criteria associated with 
discreteness promise less error in administration and greater security 
for members of the majority. Insularity limits interaction with the ma-
jority, minimizing the chance that negative impacts will indirectly spill 
over to the majority. Insular groups are often geographically local-
39. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
40. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
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ized, making it easier to target effects without fear of spillover.41 
A group can be immutable in two senses - entry and exit. As the 
term is commonly employed, it denotes the inability to escape a given 
classification. If someone is black, they stay black. As such any dam-
age which befalls the group falls on its members forever; it cannot be 
avoided. This usage is consistent with the idea of gaining benefits by 
picking on a safe target. Exclusion from jobs or other opportunities 
works most effectively for the majority if the members of the minority 
cannot escape to the majority. 
Immutable can also mean that a category cannot be entered. In 
this sense, a completely immutable group is the safest target of all 
since there is no probability that a member of the majority will suffer 
the disadvantages. Some categories such as race and gender are im-
mutable in both senses. Others, such as alienage, are immutable only 
in the second sense, but that is sufficient to make them a safe target. 
Insular, discrete, and immutable minorities are in danger because a 
majority, if it were politically active, would be willing to impose dis-
proportionate burdens on them which it would not as freely impose if 
members of that majority faced a substantial risk of bearing these bur-
dens. 42 As such, disproportionate burdens on minorities, one of the 
conditions for majoritarian bias, is closely linked with insularity, dis-
creteness, and immutability. 
Majoritarian bias, however, also requires a politically active major-
ity. The distinctions and divisions which define traditional minorities 
ease the task of activating the usually dormant low-impact majority. 
The more familiar a classification or source of difference the easier it is 
to draw the dormant majority's attention and move it to act. Discrete-
ness and insularity contribute here: strong, clear distinctions simplify 
communicating with and organizing the majority. Ethnic, religious, 
and racial differences are simple and traditional sources of definition. 
People, exposed to these simple symbols at an early age, recognize and 
react to them easily. Simple symbols decrease the costs of communi-
cation, information, and organization, thereby making it more likely 
that the majority will be active rather than dormant. When these sim-
41. When the Carotene Products Court chose the phrases "discrete and insular" to define 
minorities in need of judicial protection, Nazi racism was on the rise in Europe. Jews, a tradi· 
tional minority, were ghettoized and forced to wear identifying badges, and so became easily 
identifiable safe targets for dismissal from jobs, confiscation of property, and extermination. Had 
the threat of such severe mistreatment been more diffuse, it would have not been nearly so politi-
cally tolerable to the German people. 
42. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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ple symbols also define safe targets, political figures can tap majority 
support. 
Thus, the criteria used to identify traditional minorities also iden-
tify severe instances of majoritarian bias. Disproportionate impacts re-
quire safe targets. Such safety is greatest when the target is discrete, 
insular, and immutable. Activating a dormant majority is made easier 
by the simple symbols inherent in traditional categories like race, reli-
gion, ethnicity, and gender. 
C. The Focus on Systemic Representation 
The conceptions of political malfunction I have set out picture 
governmental decisionmakers as large and complex institutions in 
which the interaction of many forces or influences determine out-
comes. Decisions are made by large systems rather than a few govern-
ment officials. Political malfunction is defined by failures of 
representation in a system as a whole. This emphasis on the larger 
system better reflects the realities of governmental decisionmaking 
than approaches which focus only on the characteristics of official ac-
tors such as legislators. As such the conception employed here differs 
significantly from several existing constitutional theories which define 
political malfunction in terms of the mental states of government 
officials. 
John Ely's theory of judicial review is the preeminent example of 
an analysis built around a conception of political malfunction which 
stresses the importance of the mental states of government officials. 
This conception is particularly important to Ely's analysis of equal 
protection law. For Ely, the essence of political malfunction is illicit 
motivation on the part of governmental officials in the form either of 
direct animosity to a given group or self-serving stereotypes which de-
grade this group. Ely offers a simple hypothetical to make his point.43 
A platoon leader is given the task of choosing three men for dangerous 
duty. If the leader chooses on a random basis or on the basis of some 
characteristics appropriate to the task, the choice would be considered 
fair. If, on the other hand, the leader choose,s based on personal ani-
mus or self-serving stereotypes, the choice would be considered unfair 
and inappropriate. The central feature of political malfunction, Ely 
would argue, is the motivation of the government decisionmaker. 
In contrast, the conception of political malfunction presented in 
this article emphasizes forces permeating the entire political process, 
such as voting rules, jurisdictional size, or characteristics of the popu-
43. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 137-39. 
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lation (especially those concerned with the issue). Voters, lobbyists, 
and others of influence are as important as legislators. Once one con-
siders the implications of these systemic forces, a conception of polit-
ical malfunction based on the personal animus or stereotyping of 
legislators seems too limited a basis for defining political malfunction. 
A closer look at Ely's simple hypothetical shows why. 
Suppose we were aware of a platoon leader who hated or stereo-
typed the children of his immediate superiors. We might consider this 
unfair or inappropriate, but would we call for external review and con-
trol? Incentives already in place make it unlikely that the platoon 
leader would base his selection on these mental states. In fact, the 
examples Ely uses to show his theory at work in constitutional law 
always involve judicial protection for minorities or other groups who 
are politically underrepresented in the larger system. Ely's theory, 
however, defines a much broader set of persons in need of protection 
than do his examples. Legislators differ from and may dislike or pre-
judge people who are not underrepresented in the general political 
process. Most legislators are not extremely wealthy. Most are not or 
have not been farmers or members of labor unions. Legislators may 
well envy and despise the rich and hold simplistic and demeaning 
views of laborers or farmers. But these groups are usually able to de-
fend themselves within the political process. Farmers and union mem-
bers are a powerful voting block. The wealthy are a concentrated 
group likely to be able to influence the political process through such 
channels as political contributions, graft, or lobbying. These groups 
do not need protection outside of the political system because animus 
toward these groups by governmental officials is controlled by factors 
within the system. Ely's theory calls for such protection. 
Legislator animus or stereotyping also seems a dubious necessary 
condition for political malfunction. Legislation which severely harms 
a racial minority underrepresented in the larger political process seems 
the product of a political malfunction whether passed by kindly legis-
lators who, wishing to stay in office to do good on other subjects, re-
luctantly voted for it, or by voting automatons simply serving as 
conduits for the desires of their constituents, or by racist legislators 
venting their own hatred and racial stereotypes. We might view some 
of these legislators as better or worse people. But their personal at-
tractiveness is not the primary issue. The issue is or ought to be the 
chance that a group will be seriously underrepresented in the political 
process as a whole. 
Hateful legislators whose desires run counter to the forces of influ-
ence within the political system are likely to be controlled by that sys-
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tern itself. On the other hand, if systemic forces create a strong 
tendency toward either of the malfunctions we have identified, the 
presence of hateful legislators is only a convenience. Recall that we 
are building conceptions of political malfunction in order to aid in the 
difficult decision of how to allocate the scarce resource of judicial re-
view. The conceptions we construct should emphasize those elements 
which will be least likely to be corrected within the political process. 
In my view, those elements are systemic. 44 
Another set of constitutional theories of judicial review also fo-
cuses on the mental states of government officials. The authors of 
these theories stress the failure of government officials to concern 
themselves about values higher than individual private interest. 
Phrases like "deliberation" and "civic virtue" permeate these theories. 
Cass Sunstein's theory of the judicial role in public law is the most 
developed of these theories.45 In Sunstein's view, political malfunc-
tion, and therefore the judicial role, are defined by the failure of legis-
lators to go beyond selfish concerns - theirs or those of their 
constituents - to deliberation of a higher public interest. Sunstein 
argues that his theory most closely captures the views of James 
Madison. We will address that argument subsequently.46 But, taken 
on its own, Sunstein's basic institutional analysis suffers from the same 
problems as Ely's, in addition to problems inherent in the vision of 
judges as the determiners of general principles or the searchers for 
morality or moral evolution. 
Governmental failure to deliberate seems an unworkable sufficient 
condition for judicial review. Very little governmental action is the 
product of removed, neutral, public-interest deliberation. Failure of 
these conditions would suggest that virtually all such actions would be 
candidates for serious judicial scrutiny. Such a situation would 
grossly violate even the weakest requirements of institutional alloca-
tion under our Constitution.47 
Failure of deliberation also fails as a necessary condition. Deliber-
ative, neutral decisionmaking is one of those attractive images that 
pervades constitutional scholarship. Government officials in careful 
thought may seem unbiased and trustworthy when envisioned in isola-
tion. But societal decisionmaking never leaves these officials isolated. 
Deliberation and severe political malfunction are compatible. 
44. We will discuss the Supreme Court's use of a test like that proposed by Ely after we have 
examined judicial limitations more closely. See Part IIl.B.2 infra. 
45. Sunstein, supra note 2. 
46. See Part II.D infra. 
47. See Part I supra. 
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Well intentioned, high-minded government officials can easily be 
the instruments of severe political malfunction in a context which dis-
torts what they see and understand or which distorts their decisions in 
aggregation with others. The complexity and size of society make 
each government official dependent on others in society for informa-
tion, wisdom, and aid in shouldering the responsibility of decision-
making. This interdependence operates in a wide variety of channels 
or processes. Some views are overrepresented in these processes and, 
therefore, in the perceptions of these officials. Honest administrators 
who hear only the views of organized special interests may believe they 
are deliberating the public interest. Other views are absent and, there-
fore, unavailable to correct misconceptions or otherwise discipline 
these officials. In such a context, legislators who believe that women 
should be protected from the evils of the marketplace or that blacks 
are better suited for trade schools or that citizens should be preferred 
over aliens for government jobs may be honestly deliberating the pub-
lic interest. The recent Iran-Contra affair has shown that severe 
problems can exist even when government officials operate according 
to zealously maintained visions of the public interest. Malfunctions lie 
in the general political process, not the mindset of the governmental 
actors.48 
Deliberation and its relationship to a higher sense of citizenship 
form an important theme in recent scholarship. 49 The rejection of self-
interested preference as the sole basis of societal decisionmaking has 
strong intuitive appeal. But as the foregoing analysis shows, the way 
these commentators employ this notion has severe analytical 
problems. Although constitutional commentators are impressively el-
oquent in their rejection of selfish preference, they are disturbingly 
mute about alternative conceptions. 
Paradoxically, rather than articulate an alternative conception of 
societal good, these commentators attempt to sidestep the task with 
simplistic institutional arguments which equate a societal deci-
sionmaker or a trait of decisionmaking with the existence of these 
otherwise undefined conceptions of societal good. Sunstein's reliance 
on deliberation is an example. It is certainly not the only or the most 
48. It is Sunstein's position that Madison hoped that removal of national legislators from 
local majorities by distance and, to some degree, by indirect election would produce the opportu-
nity for contemplation of a higher good. As the subsequent discussion of the framing of the 
original Constitution will show, there are reasons to doubt Sunstein's perception of Madison's 
position. As we shall see, even if Sunstein is correct about Madison, the resulting removal of 
national legislators from local majorities is likely to substitute one bias or distortion of influence 
for another. 
49. See Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986), for 
a good presentation of the various positions on civic virtue. 
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fragile example.50 But, as the analysis of Sunstein's position shows, 
simplistic institutional arguments, especially those which ignore sys-
50. A classic example of a futile attempt to associate philosophical position and institutional 
outcome is found in the approach of David A.J. Richards and Ronald Dworkin. See, Richards, 
Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The Problem of Change and Stability in Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 4 u. DAYrON L. REv. 295 (1979); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY, 90-94, 188-92 (1977). Their logic operates as follows. The legislature is clearly the 
utilitarian determiner (the proposition is considered so obvious that no argument is offered). On 
this basis, rights which operate to invalidate legislation show the existence of strong anti-utilita-
rian principles in our Constitution. Further, since the legislature is utilitarian, it cannot check its 
own process against anti-utilitarian constructs. This must be done by the judiciary. Thus, the 
authors prove both the existence of anti-utilitarian principles and the role of the judiciary in 
protecting them. 
The argument that utilitarianism is associated with the political process while anti-utilitarian-
ism is associated with the judiciary is fatally simplistic. The majoritarian political process is 
hardly a perfect determiner of utilitarian outcomes; the analogous consideration of representa-
tion of citizen desires presented here shows that. A utilitarian Constitution would not necessarily 
allocate decisionmaking to the legislature, or indeed form that legislature in the most directly 
democratic manner. It is easy to conceive of trumps on the legislature in a utilitarian system. 
Therefore, the existence of such trumps does not indicate the existence of anti-utilitarian ele-
ments. In some instances courts removed from the political process may be superior determiners 
of the utilitarian good. 
Nor is it by any means clear that the superior determiner of the anti-utilitarian ideal (or 
ideals) is the judiciary rather than the legislature or the executive, let alone whether we would 
prefer the federal or state judiciaries, legislatures, or executives or how these various institutions 
should be designed or structured. Even if we were to assume Dworkin's and Richards's first 
argument, that the legislature is always the superior determiner of utilitarianism, it does not 
mean that the legislature is not also the superior determiner of anti-utilitarianism. To be superior 
in one vein does not make the entity inferior in another. 
To go further one would have to specify how nonutilitarian principles are designated and 
protected. Anti-utilitarians often assign the judiciary this role because the judiciary is considered 
the most deliberative or contemplative branch. Even assuming these traits, why should we as-
sume that they are essential in the designation and protection of nonutilitarian principles? The 
relevance of deliberation is supported, if at all, by analogy to personal search for principles higher 
than self-interest. These arguments confuse aggregate (societal) and personal (individual) deci-
sionmaking. The modes by which we attain the higher good in a large society may be quite 
different from the manner in which we search for that good on a personal level. There are good 
reasons to believe that on the societal level this search is usually (but not always) better accom-
plished by the less deliberative political process than by the more deliberative judiciary. See Back 
to the Future, supra note 8, at 210-16. 
Nor are arguments about the inability of the legislature to police itself helpful. These are 
simply arguments for institutional allocation by default, which cannot hold up in a sophisticated 
institutional analysis. Allocation by default is a common institutional argument made by consti-
tutional scholars. In one fashion or another, problems with the political process are revealed and 
the judiciary swept into place by the assertion that since they are the only entity outside this 
defective political process they must be the determiner. But such arguments are flawed. 
The legislative process is not monolithic. It does not fit the image of the evil individual who 
would hardly be likely to police himself or herself. There are millions of individuals - and 
numerous interests, positions, and factions - operating within the process. These positions op-
erate to balance and control each other. The degree and form of this internal control varies over 
time. As we have seen, this is the mechanism of control on which we rely in most instances. I 
would hardly argue that this is the ideal, or more importantly, even the optimal means of polic-
ing in all instances. But it cannot be dismissed a priori. Institutional allocation cannot be deter-
mined simply by a bromide like "one can't police oneself." In a complex institutional setting in 
which all institutions are highly constrained and imperfect, the defects in one process do not 
validate allocation to an alternative. These defects may be necessary conditions, but they are far 
from sufficient ones. 
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temic elements, are insufficient as institutional analyses let alone as 
definitions of the public good. 
The proponents of the anti-preference position must do more than 
assert the need for more than preferences. They must articulate these 
principles and carefully consider their relationship to that complex al-
location of decisionmaking which is constitutional law. There is no 
simple correspondence between a sophisticated definition of the public 
good and a specific allocation of societal decisionmaking. Basic insti-
tutional choices like the definition and role of the legislature, execu-
tive, or judiciary and indeed the very nature of government are not 
self-evident from a given definition of the public good or vice versa. 
There is a subtle, iterative relationship between institutional choice 
and the choice of the public good. Clearly institutional choice or anal-
ysis is dependent on the definition of the public good which these 
choices are meant to serve. On the other hand, conceptions of the 
public good have little meaning without some sense of how they will 
be achieved. A conception of the public good which cannot come into 
being makes little sense. 
What we mean by the public good is often conditioned by our as-
sumptions or beliefs about how societal institutions function. Affection 
for liberty or freedom and the definition of particular liberties or free-
doms seem linked to particular fears of government misbehavior. The 
civil or natural rights of a given age seem closely related to recent 
histories of government misbehavior concerning these subjects.51 The 
more sophisticated we are about institutional behavior and those fac-
tors which cause it, the more sophisticated we will be about our no-
tions of the public good and, in particular, our sense of which values 
or freedoms we wish to emphasize in which contexts. In tum, a better-
developed sense of what we want will aid us in institutional choice. 
I have conceived of political malfunction in terms of significant 
and systemic failure to represent the interests of the populace partly 
because respect for citizen interests ought to be a central component of 
any measure of the public good. It troubles me that it is an incomplete 
measure and one which disturbs many, yet I am handicapped by the 
lack of adequately articulated alternative conceptions. 
I believe, however, that the analysis of institutional behavior 
presented here, with its emphasis on simultaneous comparison of insti-
51. For example, the natural rights emphasized in late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
tury American jurisprudence, such as the right to sell or control one's labor or property, see, e.g., 
Justice Bushrod Washington's often-quoted list of "fundamental rights" in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 
F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230), followed a period of royal manipulation and suppression 
of such activity in England and the colonies. See c. HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION, 
1603-1714 (1961). 
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tutions and systemic considerations, provides insights which are appli-
cable across any conception of the public good. Even the more 
particularized notions of majoritarian and minoritarian bias presented 
here are likely to have broad application. Indeed, given the rough ap-
proximations and tendencies which characterize this stage of my anal-
ysis, I would guess that the constructs and insights presented here 
would be relevant given any sensible alteration in the underlying con-
ception of the public good. 52 
This proposition will be tested to some degree by the applications 
in this article. It can be tested further if constitutional commentators 
will give institutional choice and institutional analysis the attention 
they deserve. It is the importance of institutional analysis, not the 
validity of any particular conception of the public good, which con-
cerns me. We can begin to explore the validity of the conceptions of 
political malfunction set out here by examining how well they aid us in 
understanding the framing of the original Constitution. 
D. The Polar Models: A Look at the Framing 
of the Original Constitution 
Concerns about both majoritarian and minoritarian bias have 
played a central role throughout our constitutional history,53 particu-
52. It must also be remembered that the representation of citizen interests (or its failure) is 
used to define political malfunction and, therefore, to define an important condition for judicial 
intervention. But it does not necessarily define how the judiciary should resolve those issues 
which, because of this malfunction, the judiciary ought to consider reviewing and remaking. I 
am not suggesting that judges resolve societal issues solely on the basis of citizen interests. In 
reality, the character of judicial decisionmaking makes it unlikely that the courts would ever be a 
very good instrument to poll the citizenry. In instances of severe political malfunction, they 
might be better than the political process, but that's not saying much. 
Courts will ultimately resolve these issues in a manner which is difficult to specify. As we 
shall see, judges must continuously reconsider various institutional factors like resource limita-
tions, subject-matter expertise, and comparative biases which do not disappear when the courts 
make the first rough determination that they might take over an area of societal decisionmaking. 
Ultimately, however, there comes a point in the remaking of these societal decisions when judges 
must turn to those musings that constitute individual human decisionmaking, whether they are 
called contemplation, deliberation, intuition, tradition, or just plain guessing. Presumably, these 
musings will respect citizen interests, desires, and preferences, but they are likely to reflect other 
concerns as well. 
53. Fears of minoritarian bias can be seen in the Jacksonian era, which laid heavy emphasis 
on concerns about the role of special interests. See, e.g., M. MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PER-
SUASION (1960). This trend continued into the post-Civil War period, manifested directly in 
constitutional positions like that of Justice Field, who sought an expansive reading of the four-
teenth amendment in response to his perception of the undue influence of small organized forces 
at the state and local level. See McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-
Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. 
HIST. 970, 976-77, 981 (1975). 
On the other hand, one can see the emphasis on majoritarian bias in Carolene Products -
both the footnote and the case. In the case, the Court rejected a significant role for the judiciary 
in reviewing economic regulatory legislation despite the potential of minoritarian bias; in the 
footnote, the Court asserted a strong concern about the protection of minorities. 308 U.S. 144, 
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lady in the framing and ratification of the original Constitution. This 
period shows clear concern about both these forms of bias. In fact, the 
two opposing constitutional positions of the time - the Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists - can be traced through the differences in their 
concerns about majoritarian as opposed to minoritarian bias. 
Recent work on the period between the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the Constitutional Convention suggests a gradual change in 
perceptions about the dangers of government. Political thinking at the 
time of the Revolution placed heavy emphasis on the excesses of the 
monarchy and the royal governors. There was an accompanying great 
faith in the legislature and the associated broader-based franchise.s4 
These early American perceptions paralleled the English experience, 
where hostility to royal grants of special favors to a privileged few 
produced seventeenth century constitutional reforms increasing the 
role of Parliament. ss By the time of the framing of the Constitution, 
however, the greaLfaith in the legislature had waned in substantial 
part because of the perceived excesses of post-Revolutionary legislative 
majorities. The potential for excesses by both executive and legislative 
branches raised concerns about the excesses of both the few and the 
many - concerns about the undue influence of both minorities and 
majorities. s6 The degree of concern about one or the other of these 
influences, however, varied significantly between proponents and op-
ponents of the proposed Constitution. 
The Framers, or at least those who authored the Federalist papers, 
recognized the existence of both forms of bias, expressed concern 
about both, but seemed to worry most about majorities. James 
Madison in particular placed great emphasis on the dangers of the 
majority: 
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the 
152 n.4 (1938). The Warren Court will be remembered best for its decisions protecting tradi· 
tional minorities. At the same time, that Court radically de-emphasized judicial review of eco· 
nomic regulation even when there were clear indications of strong special interest influence. See, 
e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding state statute prohibiting 
opticians from providing eyeglasses without a prescription from an optometrist or opthamolo· 
gist); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding state statute restricting "business of 
debt adjusting" to lawyers). 
In analyses of modem America, many social scientists place great emphasis on minoritarian 
bias, whether in the form of the economist's theories of regulation or the political scientist's 
concepts of special interest legislation or agency capture. See, e.g., Stigler, The Theory of Eco· 
nomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971); M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSI· 
NESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); THE PoLmcs OF REGULATION (J. Wilson ed. 
1980); B. MITNICK, THE PoLmCAL EcoNOMY OF REGULATION (1980). 
54. See, e.g., G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). 
55. See C. HILL, supra note 51. 
56. See G. WOOD, supra note 54, at 135, 237-44; D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF 
THE FEDERALIST 131 (1984). 
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republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister 
views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse 
the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under 
the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, 
the form of popular Government, on the other hand, enables it to sacri-
fice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of 
other citizens. . . . 
... [T]he majority ... must be rendered, by their number and local 
situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of 
oppression. . . . 
... [A] pure Democracy, by which I mean a Society consisting of a 
small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the Government 
in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. 57 
And also: 
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of 
oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of 
the community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be appre-
hended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constit-
uents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of 
the major number of the Constituents. This is a truth of great impor-
tance, but not yet sufficiently attended to . . . . 58 
These comments reveal two other elements of importance. They 
emphasize the systemic nature of political malfunction. Madison's 
analysis is not based on the mindset of public officials. Majorities are 
most to be feared because they are least likely to have their influence 
checked within the larger political system. Whether or not Madison's 
view that majorities were most to be feared is correct, his argument 
reflects a sophisticated perception of the systemic nature of political 
malfunction. 
Madison's comments also reveal the major Federalist response to 
this perceived danger: the removal or insulation of federal govern-
ment decisionmakers from local populations. They sought this insula-
tion in several ways. First, these decisionmakers were physically 
distanced. The national capital was generally much further from most 
citizens than the seat of state or local governments; physical distance 
was no small factor at a time when travel was so difficult. Second, 
each of these decisionmakers was to represent a large number of con-
stituents, thereby making organization of a majority more difficult. 
Third, they served for relatively long terms ranging from two to six 
years. As such, their constituents had far less frequent access through 
the ballot box and a more complex , record to decipher and judge. 
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59-60 (J. Madison) (H. Dawson ed. 1863). 
58. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in THE MIND 
OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE PoLmCAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 206 (M. Mey-
ers ed. 1973) (emphasis in original). 
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Fourth, the Senate and President were indirectly elected - the Senate 
by state legislatures and the President by the electoral college.59 
The Federalists were not opposed to popular government. They 
gave us a Constitution with elective offices and finite terms of service. 
No government officials held office by right of birth and all, except the 
judges, faced periodic reelection either by direct vote of the populace 
or by bodies whose members were themselves subject to periodic elec-
tion. 60 But there can be no doubt that pure majoritarian government 
was not what the Federalists wanted. They were very concerned 
about protection against what they perceived as the excesses of the 
majority. 
Their opponents, the more heterogeneous Anti-Federalists,61 ap-
pear far more concerned about minoritarian bias than the Federalists. 
The Anti-Federalists feared that indirectly elected Senators serving 
long terms would devolve into an aristocracy and combine with the 
indirectly elected President to allow an easy conduit for "the advan-
tage of the few ... over the many."62 In response, they sought rota-
tion in office, shorter terms, the possibility of recall, and easier 
impeachment. 63 They also feared that the House was insufficiently nu-
merous to enable it to be "a representation of the people" and, there-
fore, would be subject to influence and corruption. 64 They feared "the 
superior opportunities for organized voting which they felt to be inher-
ent in the more thickly populated areas."65 They feared that a 
Supreme Court not subject to popular control would favor the rich. 66 
As we have seen, these are all signs of concern about minoritarian bias. 
59. See D. EPSTEIN, supra note 56, at 59, 95-97, 99-100, 105. 
60. Madison, in particular, opposed the election of the Senate by state legislatures and any 
attempt to seek a "mixed" government such as the English parliamentary monarchy. Id. at 122-
23. 
61. "[T]he Antifederalists were far from united in their political ideas." J. MAIN, THE ANTI-
FEDERALISTS 119 (1961); see Wood, The Worthy Against the Licentious, in CONFEDERATION 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 86 (G. Wood ed. 1973). 
62. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADEL· 
PHIA, IN 1787, at 493-94 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES] (comments of George Ma-
son). See also id. at 503-04 (comments of Patrick Henry); id. at 220 (comments of James 
Monroe). 
63. See id. at 50 (comments of Patrick Henry). See also note 62 supra and materials cited 
therein. 
64. Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 380 (H. Storing ed. 1981) 
(essay of Nov. 15, 1787); see also Letters of Centine/, in id. at 142 (letter I); Letters from tlte 
Federal Farmer, in id. at 235 (letter of Oct. 10, 1787); 2 DEBATES, supra note 62, at 248-49 
(comments of Melancton Smith); 3 id. at 281-82 (comments of William Grayson). 
65. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Gov-
ernment, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 13 (1955). 
66. See Essays of Brutus, supra note 64, at 438-39 (essay of Mar. 20, 1788); 1 DEBATES, supra 
note 62, at 495 (comments of George Mason). 
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This tension between the Federalist and Anti-Federalist positions 
centered on the controversy over the relative roles of larger versus 
smaller jurisdictions - in particular, the role of the state versus the 
national government. As we have seen, Madison feared the power of 
the majority more than that of the minority. He saw the answer in a 
stronger national government as well as the indirect election of gov-
ernment officials. The Anti-Federalists believed in small jurisdictions 
and feared that, as governments grew larger and more remote, the 
concentrated few would subvert the process. 
From an institutional perspective, it is easy to understand the im-
portance given jurisdictional size by those who debated the original 
Constitution. The factors we have already discussed coalesce here. 
Smaller jurisdictions tend to decrease the costs of organization, acqui-
sition of information, and access to political influence. At the simplest 
level, local officials are physically more accessible. They live among 
their constituents and the official locus of decisionmaking is within the 
locale. Unlike members of Congress, local and even state representa-
tives have their primary residences in the locale they represent; state 
capitals are, in most instances, far more accessible than is Washington, 
D.C. The legislatures of smaller jurisdictions tend to be smaller and to 
operate on fewer issues. State and local officials tend to serve shorter 
terms than their federal counterparts. Shorter terms and simpler 
agendas make it easier to understand and evaluate the actions of these 
officials. Easier understanding means less need for investment in infor-
mation and less need for the organization which goes with it. Smaller 
populations mean fewer people to inform and fewer people to organize 
for effective political action. As a general matter, smaller jurisdictions 
tend to be more homogeneous. As such, it is easier to identify the 
views shared by the majority. Ease of identification and similarity in 
views simplifies organization and communication. 
Both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists understood the connec-
tions between size of jurisdiction and political response; they had dif-
ferent views on the results. To the Federalists, politically active local 
majorities were the problem and a more complex, indirect national 
government was the answer. To the Anti-Federalists, the opposite was 
true. These two very different views of jurisdictional size envision very 
different trade-offs between majoritarian and minoritarian bias. 67 
The Federalist and Anti-Federalist positions both possess itiade-
67. Important technological changes may have altered the association between size of juris-
diction and form of bias which characterized the views of those who debated the original Consti-
tution. Vastly improved transportation has made the national capital far more accessible. More 
important, the growth of a national news media makes the happenings in Washington far more 
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quacies and inconsistencies. Anti-Federalists can be seen as the heirs 
to the classical republican tradition. They envisioned a republic small 
in size with a small and homogeneous population. 68 The great prob-
lem for the Anti-Federalists was the extrapolation of republican ideals 
to a large, dispersed, and heterogeneous population. They did not 
have an alternative for a national government.69 
For the Federalists, whose affirmative program was more directly 
embodied in the Constitution, the problems are more subtle and yet 
more important. Madison and the Federalists stressed government on 
a larger scale with political decisionmakers (legislators and executives) 
removed from the mass of the populace both by distance and by mode 
of selection. The analysis of political malfunction employed here sug-
gests that, to the extent that the Federalist structure achieved the insu-
lation of officials from the general populace, it traded one bias for 
another. 
Greater distance, more complex modes of selection, and larger and 
more diverse constituencies provide protection of public officials from 
the masses - but not complete isolation. Other paths of influence, 
and therefore sources of bias, remain and in fact flourish. The more 
complex setting enhances the power of organization and the accumu-
lation of funds while it helps conceal underhanded dealings. Isolation 
provides respite from the masses but not from concentrated minorities. 
In other words, removal may purchase protection from majoritarian 
bias by increasing the potential for minoritarian bias. 
This trade-off is an important reality which we will consider 
throughout the article. The Anti-Federalists seemed to understand 
the trade-off. In my view, Madison and the other Federalists also rec-
ognized this trade-off and chose what they considered the lesser evil. 
Cass Sunstein's view is different. 
accessible to citizens throughout the nation. There may in fact be more information available 
through the media about the national government than about state or local governments. 
These shifts are countered by other changes in two hundred years. The nation has grown in 
size and population. That population is far more heterogeneous, especially at the national level. 
The scope and complexity of societal issues, especially those decided at the national level, has 
grown. These changes will be considered as we work our way through modern constitutional 
law. 
68. See Michelman, supra note 49, at 19; Essays of Brutus, supra note 64, at 109-13; Wood, 
supra note 61, at 97; 1 DEBATES, supra note 62, at 481 (letter from Yates and Lansing); Letters 
from the Federal Farmer, supra note 64, at 230; Kenyon, supra note 65, at 6-8. They apparently 
envisioned an exchange of ideas which allows the populace to recognize and support a public 
good greater than any narrower self-interest with which members of that populace might have 
begun. They feared that this exchange would not occur in larger, more heterogeneous popula-
tions. Wood, supra note 61, at 97; Letters ofCentinel. supra note 64, at 141; id. at 56. 
69. The same problem remains for those who today wish to resurrect these republican ideals. 
See Michelman, supra note 49, at 17-55. What institutional form will organize a society which 
today is far larger and more heterogeneous than it was in 1787? 
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Sunstein believes that Madison's attempt to remove federal legisla-
tors from the pressures of local majorities was motivated by a desire to 
secure greater opportunity for legislative deliberation in the service of 
a public good beyond preferences.70 He points to Madison's desire for 
a legislature made up of "a chosen body of citizens ... whose patriot-
ism and love of justice" would lead them to serve as "enlightened 
statesmen."71 Whatever Madison's desires, however, he apparently 
did not hold out much hope that such a legislature would result from 
the structures established in the Constitution. David Epstein, whose 
extensive examination of the Federalist position Sunstein uses to sup-
port his own view of Madison, finds a significant gap between 
Madison's desires and his perception of reality.72 There is a conflict 
between Madison's vision of the outcome of a system which would 
check the power of any single faction by pitting one faction against 
another and the ascendancy to office of "enlightened statesmen" with 
a neutral view.73 Madison may have hoped for the ascendancy of noble 
spirits but he apparently expected and planned for far more mortal 
ones. 
Sunstein portrays Madison as believing that decisionmakers, cut 
loose from the pressures of the majority, would somehow be free from 
other influences and transcend private interests. It seems unlikely that 
Madison was unsophisticated enough to believe that deliberation 
about the public interest is the likely result of removing government 
officials from majoritarian political pressure. If that was his belief, it 
would be a particularly poor piece of Madison's analysis upon which 
to build a modern theory. 
Madison and the Federalists were not necessarily wrong to empha-
size the need to address majoritarian over minoritarian bias. The cor-
rect choice depends on a number of factors, such as size of the 
jurisdiction or complexity of the issues, which may make one or the 
other bias more likely. As the analysis develops, we will find concerns 
about both forms of political malfunction throughout constitutional 
law. The polar models are powerful precisely because neither is al-
ways appropriate. 
Analysis of these malfunctions plays a role in a larger analytical 
framework. Whether one or the other form of political malfunction is 
somehow more pernicious or prevalent cannot be considered in the 
70. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text. 
71. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 41, 43 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58, 60 (J. 
Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898)). 
72. D. EPSTEIN, supra note 56, at 87-88, 97-100, 138-41, 150-53. 
73. Id. at 108-09. 
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abstract. The efficacy of judicial review depends on the characteristics 
of the reviewer as well as those of the reviewed. In this scheme, the 
proper judicial role is a match between the potential political malfunc-
tion and the potential for judicial response. The rest of this article 
explores this match by examining judicial response and its variation in 
form and effectiveness across the two forms of political malfunction. 
III. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
Having provided an overview of societal decisionmaking domi-
nated by the political process, and divided the malfunctions of the 
political process into two polar forms, we now seek to identify when 
and how the judiciary responds to these malfunctions. The first sec-
tion of this Part suggests some working hypotheses about judicial limi-
tations and capacities. The second section categorizes and examines 
the judicial response to the political malfunctions we have thus far 
discussed. 
A. Judicial Constraints and Capacities 
1. Limited Resources and the Cost of Judicial Response 
Identification of political malfunction - a severe systemic under-
representation of a given interest - is only a first step in defining the 
dimensions of judicial review. The identification of a political mal-
function does not automatically mean that the resulting government 
action is invalid. It means only that the governmental determination 
is biased and it identifies the direction of the bias. The presence of 
such a bias does not necessarily mean that the same decision would 
not have been made by an unbiased process. 
Thus, for example, the congressional restriction on the interstate 
sale of filled milk, at issue in Carolene Products, may well have been 
the product of a Congress subject to severe minoritarian bias. The 
interests of the dairy industry may have been overrepresented relative 
to that of the dispersed majority of consumers. But, an unbiased Con-
gress in which consumer interests were adequately represented might 
also have passed the restriction, based perhaps on the offsetting bene-
fits to consumer safety. 
Severe bias provides grounds to distrust the determination of the 
political process. The more severe the bias, the greater the distrust. 
But courts cannot act on this distrust without remaking the underly-
ing societal decision. Despite continuing claims by judges that they do 
not make legislative decisions or social policy, that is precisely what 
judicial review (no matter how it is defined) requires them to do. As 
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such, the judiciary's ability to resolve the underlying societal decision 
becomes relevant. 
We have emphasized the severely limited resources of the judici-
ary, especially relative to the ever-growing number of government ac-
tions potentially subject to review.74 The resource costs of judicial 
review, which can vary substantially from one subject matter to an-
other, affect not only the amount but also the form of judicial review. 
These costs depend on the ease with which courts can distinguish 
valid from invalid governmental activity, and their ability to formulate 
and articulate a corresponding clear test. Clear tests mean fewer cases 
brought, litigated, and appealed, and therefore a smaller burden on the 
judiciary. Such clarity, however, involves a degree of arbitrariness or, 
more gently, generalization, which risks invalidating good legislation 
or accepting bad. The chances as well as the costs of such an error 
vary with the subject matter of the legislation under review. Some 
subject matter - like foreign affairs - may be so complex and sensi-
tive that sweeping rules could be established only at unacceptable 
costs.75 In general, the more rigid the rule the greater the pressure to 
allow qualifications which make the rule dependent on a wider variety 
of circumstances, eventually evolving into a more flexible standard. 
The price for this flexibility is a larger continuing role for the 
judiciary. 
This interaction between resource costs, risks of error, and the po-
tential for sweeping solutions determines the price tag for judicial re-
view of a given area of government activity. This price tag cannot help 
but influence the selection of areas for judicial review as well as the 
form of that review.76 From this perspective, for example, the price 
tag of judicial review in the era of economic due process, high at the 
outset, grew much higher as limiting strategies failed and the govern-
74. See Part I supra. 
75. In a creative analysis of the political question doctrine, Fritz Scharpf argued that subjects 
like foreign affairs were so difficult for the courts that the sweeping solution of abstention was the 
paramount response. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 
75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966). Even after twenty years, Scharpf's thoughtful analysis provides useful 
insights into the meaning and scope of judicial ability. Scharpf's general theory is examined 
extensively in Taking Institutions Seriously, supra note 8, at 381-84. 
76. It will no doubt disturb some proponents of judicial review that I am treating a hallowed 
subject in terms of limits and resources. No doubt any discussion of constraints on the capacity 
of the judiciary is speculative and intellectually treacherous. But such constraints do exist and 
they are sufficiently important to demand attention. Proponents of judicial review would be 
unwise to ignore these constraints in their analyses and arguments. Failure to consider these 
factors leaves this central issue to their opponents. More important, without an appreciation of 
the role of such factors, these analysts will not understand the judicial responses they observe and 
they will not be able to influence the judiciary to be more ambitious and productive with their 
resources. 
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ment activity increased. The courts had real difficulty developing a 
simple and efficient strategy which would discern valid from invalid 
government action. In Lochner v. New York, 77 an early instance of 
judicial invalidation of legislation under economic due process, the 
Court qualified the newly established freedom of contract allowing 
government to regulate when there were serious health and safety im-
pacts on third parties, or where there was serious need to protect one 
of the contracting parties who did not have the mental capacity to 
contract, or where the contract was the product of a monopoly situa-
tion. Anyone familiar with modern welfare economics can understand 
that these standard grounds for government intervention are both 
amorphous and pervasive. 
The courts could not simply invalidate all government regulation 
of commerce. Such a simple and sweeping solution ran too great a 
risk of invalidating valid legislation. But the vague standards of Loch-
ner presented the courts with a sizable potential for review and, there-
fore, an open-ended invitation to remake important and difficult 
societal decisions. The courts evolved a series of constructs meant to 
separate valid and invalid regulations. These constructs created a 
hodgepodge of judicial decisions filled with inconsistent twists and 
turns, undefined concepts, and enough uncertainty to allow legislation 
seemingly declared invalid to remain in effect. 78 As the output and 
77. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
78. In Lochner itself, 198 U.S. at 45, the Court invalidated maximum-hour legislation in the 
baking industry although it had shortly before approved such legislation with respect to the 
mining industry. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 396-97 (1898). Within a few years, it made an 
exception to the invalidity of maximum-hour legislation for instances where it applied particu-
larly to women. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908). Not much later, the Court 
allowed maximum-hour legislation virtually across the board without even noting that it was 
overruling Lochner. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 437-39 (1917). 
Over the same period the Court's decisions on the related subject of the validity of minimum-
wage legislation showed the opposite progression. The Court had upheld federal minimum-wage 
legislation in 1917, Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 359 (1917); upheld state minimum-wage legis-
lation in 1917, Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (per curiam), ajfg. by an equally divided 
court 69 Or. 519, 139 P. 743 and 70 Or. 261, 141 P. 158; invalidated federal minimum-wage 
legislation in 1923, Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560-62 (1923), and appeared to do 
the same for state legislation under the authority of Adkins in 1925 and 1927. Donham v. West-
Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927) (per curiam); Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925) (per 
curiam). 
The trend for the Court's treatment of minimum-wage legislation was not only inconsistent 
with the pattern of maximum-hour cases, it was also confusing. When, in 1937, the Court finally 
upheld minimum-wage laws (after apparently invalidating a similar law the previous year in 
Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936)), the Washington statute it 
upheld had been in existence for twenty-three years. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379, 390 (1937). 
During the entire era, the Court limited regulation of prices and rates to businesses "affected 
with a public interest." From its inception in the pre-Lochner case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 
113, 125-26, 133-35 (1877), to its death nearly sixty years later in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 
502, 536-39 (1934), this central concept remained a mystery. The Court flirted with the idea of 
monopoly as a defining element, but it did not consistently adhere to this criterion. See Nebbia, 
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complexity of governmental regulation increased in the 1930s, the 
costs of court involvement also increased. Although many factors 
may have contributed to the retreat from economic due process which 
occurred, the sizable and increasing price tag for judicial involvement 
and the failure of judicial strategies to control these rising costs pushed 
relentlessly in that direction. 
These costs and the courts' ability to find tractable solutions which 
lessen them only reveal one aspect of the question of judicial review. 
The analysis is comparative and the choice of whether to review is or 
should be a balance of these costs with the benefits of judicial review. 
As we have seen, these benefits are related to the severity of political 
malfunction. More severe political malfunctions justify greater out-
lays of judicial resources and greater temerity by judges. But even if 
they are not the sole determiners of judicial review, costs and tractabil-
ity cannot be ignored. The courts' resources are limited and the de-
mands on these resources grow more severe. 79 The understandable 
struggle to use these resources wisely creates pressure to resolve issues 
with the least cost possible. 
We see indications of this desire for dispatch and resolution in the 
Supreme Court's remedy in the controversial abortion decision, Roe v. 
Wade. 80 There, the Court was faced with a wide variety of abortion 
regulations and prohibitions. Although concluding that the sweeping 
solution of wholesale invalidation of all regulations and prohibitions 
was untenable, the Court nevertheless did not confine itself to invali-
dating the particular state anti-abortion law or simply to acknowledg-
ing that there might be instances in which the state's interests could 
justify regulation. Instead it set out, in detail, the circumstances in 
which the state might regulate or prohibit abortions; it divided the 
period of pregnancy neatly into thirds and defined the specific state 
responses allowed in each successive twelve-week period. 
Arbitrary elements abound. When one considers the large variety 
of potential regulations; the wide variation in health conditions with 
291 U.S. at 538. The test was adopted in Munn, virtually abandoned in Brass v. North Dakota 
ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391, 402·04 (1894), questioned in Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 
235, 239-40 (1929), and briefly resurrected in Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 
420, 438-39 (1930). For a time, the Court also spoke of a business's impact on the general public, 
see Munn, 94 U.S. at 126, but it eventually abandoned this unwieldy concept, see Tyson & 
Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 430 (1927). The Court found itself regularly admitting that the 
"public interest" test was difficult to explain and apply, see, e.g., Tyson, 273 U.S. at 430; Ribnik 
v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 355 (1928), but it kept trying to employ it. Finally, in Nebbia, the 
Court conceded that there could be no "closed class" of businesses "affected with a public inter-
est"; all businesses of any importance affect the public. 291 U.S. at 536. 
79. See note 13 supra. 
80. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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person, place, and time; and the ill-defined nature of the state's interest 
in the fetus, the compartmentalization of interests into discrete twelve-
week periods seems a very arbitrary way to balance the relevant inter-
ests. 81 In recent cases dissenters on the Court have chided the major-
ity for not allowing a more flexible, if less specific, formulation. 82 
The Roe formulation and the Court's unwillingness to increase its 
flexibility seems consistent with a desire to reduce litigation even at the 
expense of arbitrariness. Calls for a more reasonable and flexible re-
view of abortion regulation come from dissenting judges who strongly 
oppose court involvement in the abortion issue in general. Whatever 
their views on the merits, the strategy they propose would increase the 
costs of judicial activity in the area, and therefore increase the chances 
that the Court would abandon the abortion question altogether. I be-
lieve that both the majority and the dissenters understand these impli-
cations. Given the demands on judicial resources inherent in the 
uncharted right of privacy83 and the controversial issue of abortion, it 
is hardly strange that the Court should choose to impose an arbitrary 
system which roughly balances the needs of flexibility and the needs of 
specificity. 
In some areas of potential judicial involvement, sweeping solutions 
are so inappropriate that the courts must choose between more expen-
sive case-by-case review and abandonment of the area of review. The 
high costs of particularized review may cause abandonment of judicial 
involvement, as they arguably did with economic due process, or a 
refusal to get involved, as they arguably did in the context of school 
81. The concept of viability used by the Court to define the crucial third trimester in which 
the states might prohibit abortions epitomizes the arbitrariness of this trimester system. The 
Court did not derive this concept from any of the cultures or religions whose considerations of 
the abortion issue the Court so laboriously rehearsed in its opinion. Viability is a technical con· 
cept borrowed from medicine where it served purposes usually unrelated to questions of abor· 
ti on. 
The rationale for the division between the first and second trimester is less important but no 
less arbitrary. It is basically a non sequitur. The Court ruled that the states had no special 
interest in the health of the mother before the second trimester because for the first twelve weeks 
the risk to the mother from terminating pregnancy was less than that from continuing it. But 
prohibition of termination {abortion) was not in issue in the difference between the first and 
second trimester. The issue was regulation of the abortion procedures, not prohibition of abor-
tion. There was no a priori reason to believe that there were not more or less healthy ways of 
aborting in the first twelve weeks which, under the holding, the state might prescribe. 
The trimester system and the strange choice of viability have been criticized by many com-
mentators. E.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J, 920 
(1973); Lynn, Technology and Reproductive Rights: How Advances i11 Technology Ca11 Be Used 
To Limit Women's Reproductive Rights, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 223 (1983). 
82. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 
(1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 
U.S. 416 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
83. We will discuss the right of privacy more fully at the text following note 138 i11fra. 
February 1988] A Job for the Judges 695 
finance. 84 On the other hand, the importance of judicial involvement 
may cause the courts to bear these costs as they have in the school 
desegregation cases. In such instances, there are continuous pressures 
to find broader-based strategies which increase tractability and de-
crease costs. 85 
2. Judicial Bias and Capacity 
In addition to the costs of judicial decisionmaking, there are also 
considerations of bias and judicial ability. As with the legislative or 
administrative processes, we must consider the judicial process as a 
whole and raise similar questions about representation and systemic 
bias. 86 The dominant structural characteristic of the judiciary is its 
removal and insulation from direct political pressures: federal judges 
are appointed for life. Earlier, I argued that the insulation of federal 
legislators which Madison and the Federalists used to combat 
majoritarian bias traded majoritarian for minoritarian bias. Is the 
same true for the even greater insulation accorded the federal 
judiciary? 
Minoritarian bias operates in a number of ways in the political pro-
cess, including graft, prospects of future employment, or campaign 
contributions. Although the life tenure and ethos of federal judges 
may make it unlikely that they could be influenced by such prospects, 
84. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
85. The school desegregation area, in fact, has seen many innovative attempts to deal with 
these pressures. See M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1982). 
86. As with analyses of political malfunction which focus on the characteristics oflegislators, 
analyses of judicial malfunction which focus on the characteristics of judges are problematic. 
For example, Paul Brest argues that judges are elitist and unrepresentative based on their demo-
graphic characteristics. Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1982). But 
that judges are more elitist and less representative than elected officials does not follow from the 
demographics of the most observable decisionmakers. Brest points out that there are few minori-
ties or females and no nonlawyers on the federal bench. Id. at 771. Judges are also not poor; all 
have incomes substantially above average. Id. But in this simple sense, Congress is even less 
representative than the courts. Blacks make up 5% of the federal bench, but less than 4% of the 
Congress (4.6% of the House; 0% of the Senate). Women make up over 8% of the federal 
bench, but less than 5% of Congress (5% of the House and 2% of the Senate). The Supreme 
Court has one black and one woman and, therefore, in terms of simple demographics, each group 
has more than 10% membership. Most members of Congress are lawyers or business people and 
their salaries are clearly above average. 
It may be valid to argue that the judiciary is elitist or unrepresentative relative to the legisla-
ture. But those characteristics are the product of the character of the given institution not 
demographics of judges and legislators. Whatever the characteristics of the legislators, they are 
dependent on reelection to retain office. In this sense, they can be considered dependent upon 
and, therefore, representative of populations which have different demographic characteristics 
from theirs. These differences, however, need not always cut in the direction of less elitism or 
broader representation. To the extent that the mechanism of minoritarian bias characterizes the 
given political decision, the politically dominant part of the population may be less representative 
of the general population than even the legislators themselves. 
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influence can also occur through more subtle means, primarily 
through the working of the adjudication process. The adjudication 
process is an important source of information for judges. Their view 
of the issues can be molded by what they are told and shown in the 
cases brought to them. 87 Judges usually accumulate less specific infor-
mation than administrators who have narrower jurisdictions or legisla-
tors who have independent staffs for investigation. The more complex 
the issues and the less familiar the judges are with the given area, the 
more likely that they can be influenced by the information provided by 
the litigants. 
From this perspective, the primary source of bias affecting the judi-
ciary stems from the simple fact that it takes resources to litigate. The 
amount spent on litigation, like that spent on lobbying, reflects the 
ability to pool funds and, in tum, the size and distribution of the 
stakes involved. As with lobbying, dispersed groups with lower per 
capita impact face greater organizational needs and greater organiza-
tional costs than more concentrated interests. 
Many cases will not be brought and others will be underfunded 
where the interest is widely dispersed. One need only think of a dis-
pute with $1,000,000 at stake and ask whether the likelihood of litiga-
tion and the quality of that litigation would vary as one saw that stake 
concentrated on one individual, or dispersed among ten individuals, or 
100 individuals and so on. Certainly, if it were divided evenly among 
one million people, the chances of litigation would be very small. 88 
Thus, although the form and perhaps the degree of minoritarian 
bias may differ from that characterizing legislatures or administrative 
agencies, the judiciary does tend toward minoritarian bias. 89 Certain 
groups and interests will not be represented because they are dis-
persed. 90 Whether and to what extent the judicial process is less repre-
87. D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 38-39 (1977). 
88. Devices like class actions may aid in reducing this bias. But, especially given the restric· 
tions on such actions, the potential for correction is slight. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
lin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978). 
89. Consider the following comments about the role of special interests in the evolution of 
the common Jaw in this country: 
Special interest prevailed over general interest, or prevailed at unfair cost to other special 
interest, largely because legal processes did not provide that all relevant interests had ade-
quate representation .... In policy making by litigation - in the making of common law -
there was the chronic danger that public policy of general import, or bearing heavily on 
other particular interests, would be made in response to too narrow a record and too limited 
a range of argument provided by the particular litigants to whom the precedent-making 
lawsuit was open. 
J. HURST, supra note 34, at 71. 
90. The disadvantages of dispersed groups can also lead to problems with follow-up and 
periodic review. Even if a coalition is organized to bring the initial litigation, it may be difficult 
to hold it together to produce the additional litigation necessary to ensure enforcement and im-
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sentative than the political process depends on the context for 
comparison. In some contexts, the biases of the judicial process may 
be an advantage because of its match with the bias of the political 
process. As I shall argue subsequently, this bias tends to make courts 
a better match for majoritarian than minoritarian bias in the reviewed 
entity. 
Beyond issues of bias, the ability of judges to learn about and un-
derstand a given substantive area affects the tractability and costs of 
judicial review of that area. This ability can vary widely among sub-
stantive areas. In the extreme, there are the traditional doubts about 
judicial ability to understand and decide issues of foreign affairs and 
national security. Here, questions about expertise, government con-
trol of information, secrecy, and significant (but often unassessable) 
risks of judicial error induce judicial timidity. The political question 
doctrine is the most extreme expression of this diffidence.91 
On a more general level, courts do not have the investigative re-
sources available to most governmental processes. Judges do not gen-
erally have the luxury of specializing in a given area of social policy as 
do many legislators. Judges are assigned cases of all sorts often on a 
random basis. It would seem that the more complicated the social 
policy question the more unattractive the judicial alternative. 
In fact, viewed from one vantage point, courts are not good at any-
thing - or at least at anything complex and important. In an often-
cited study,92 Donald Horowitz has presented a very critical picture of 
judicial policymaking. As Horowitz sees them, courts receive infor-
mation in a skewed and halting fashion,93 misunderstand the social 
contexts of the cases before them,94 choose atypical cases as the vehi-
cles for addressing social issues,95 and generally lack the facilities, abil-
ities, and propensities for enforcing, administering, and following up 
on the cases they decide. 
All this should give pause to those romantics who see in the courts 
plementation. See generally D. HOROWITZ, supra note 87, at 51-56 (arguing that courts are not 
equipped to monitor the effects of a decision after the litigation is concluded). The existence of 
these problems are yet another reason why "sweeping solutions" and "creative arbitrariness" are 
important. The more certain (if arbitrary) the principle and the remedy, the easier (and more 
likely) its subsequent enforcement and implementation. 
91. See Scharpf, supra note 75. The courts can, to a limited degree, postpone or delay deci-
sion until they can gather more information and increase their understanding. The most subtle 
treatment of this creative use of delay is Alexander Bickel's notion of passive virtue. A. BICKEL, 
supra note 17, at 111-98. 
92. D. HOROWITZ, supra note 87. 
93. Id. at 38-41. 
94. Id. at 45-51, 260. 
95. Id. at 266-68. 
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a removed, platonic ideal capable of generally guiding society in its 
moral evolution and search for neutral principles. Courts are highly 
limited and potentially awkward decisionmakers. Advocates of judi-
cial activism must address this reality in order to legitimate a signifi-
cant judicial role. 
But Horowitz's study can do no more than force us to accept the 
reality of judicial imperfection. By its own terms it is not comparative, 
and that is far more damning than Horowitz supposes. All societal 
decisionmakers are highly imperfect. Were Horowitz to turn his criti-
cal eye to administrative agencies or legislatures he would no doubt 
find problems with expertise, access to information, characterization 
of issues, and follow-up. Careful studies would undoubtedly reveal im-
portant instances of awkwardness, error, and deleterious effect. 
The relevance of technical expertise and investigative resources can 
be understood only in terms of the incentives and pressures present in 
the given process. The image of careful investigation and broad in-
quiry seems often ill-fitted to the actual goings-on in legislatures. Leg-
islators are not technicians or scholarly investigators acquiring and 
collecting social data and issuing learned and neutral reports. They 
often ignore or manipulate technical information in line with the polit-
ical pressures in the system. 
Legislators are centrally concerned about the desires of their con-
stituents (or at least those constituents who have clout). These needs 
and desires are conveyed in threats of ouster, impassioned rallies, 
shifting vote patterns, lobbying, and the other signals of political sup-
port or opposition to which a legislator with a finite term of office 
listens so intently. What legislators hear through these processes af-
fects how they react to the technical policy information they receive. 
Under these circumstances, the greater technical fact-gathering ability 
of the legislature may be relatively unimportant. 
As a general matter, the ability to respond systematically to the 
popular will is a major advantage of the political processes over the 
judiciary. Where, however, political pressures provide a distorted pic-
ture of the public will with severe underrepresentation of parts of that 
public, a process so strongly attached to those pressures may be at a 
disadvantage relative to a more removed and insulated judicial 
process. 
Under the view presented in this article, the rare moments of judi-
cial dominance only occur in instances of severe political malfunction. 
This necessary condition severely limits the relevance of noncompara-
tive considerations of judicial ability like that of Horowitz. Severe 
limitations on judicial capability may sometimes mean that even se-
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vere political malfunctions will sometimes go unremedied because the 
remedy is worse than the problem. But, in some instances, even an 
awkward, myopic, error-prone judicial response may be superior to a 
political process in the throes of serious malfunction. 
What judges are good at may be relevant, but it is not decisive. 
They must look first to where they are needed and seek out the most 
severe examples of political malfunction. They will find many such 
instances. They then must be conscious of what they can do in light of 
these competing claims on their resources. Judges may well be called 
upon to make societal decisions which, in the abstract, they are not 
well-equipped to make. The comforts of procedural issues may have 
to give way to the discomfort of less familiar subject matter - even 
foreign affairs and national security. 
B. The Form of Response: The Match Between Political 
Malfunction and Judicial Capability 
We can now consider the balance between the severity of political 
malfunction and the limits on the judiciary and, in tum, the judicial 
responses to this balance. These responses are divided here into sev-
eral categories, which are then associated with the two forms of polit-
ical malfunction: minoritarian and majoritarian bias. 
1. Correcting the Process 
John Ely has argued that many areas of judicial activity improve 
the political process. He associates this aspect of judicial review with 
the second paragraph of the Carolene Products footnote.96 From this 
vantage, voting rights and first amendment protection of speech, press, 
and assembly improve the elective process and, therefore, subsequent 
legislative and executive decisionmaking. These "process" notions 
have played a central part in the judicial activism of the last forty to 
fifty years. Even those generally most critical of this activism see the 
first amendment and its protection of political speech and press as 
valid grounds for judicial activity.97 
From an institutional perspective, correction of malfunction has 
obvious attraction. A judiciary severely constrained by its limited re-
sources as well as doubts about its abilities must leave vast areas of 
decisionmaking unattended, and struggle with whatever it does han-
dle. If political malfunction can be reduced, fewer resources need be 
96. See J. ELY, supra note 4, at 75-77. 
97. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 
(1971). 
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expended on review of the output of the corrected process. Similarly, 
if a malfunction can be corrected, an area of political activity can be 
ignored with less regret. 
But to make each of these corrections, courts must resolve com-
plex and difficult societal issues which have already been resolved by 
the political process. If courts are to assure public access to informa-
tion about government activity, for example, they must often consider 
the implications of that access on such sensitive subjects as national 
security and foreign affairs.98 Although the corrective potential pro-
vides a significant added benefit which would and should attract the 
courts, it is not a sufficient condition for judicial intervention. It is still 
necessary to balance the relative abilities of the political and judicial 
processes to resolve the basic substantive issues involved. The exist-
ence of the corrective potential may tip the balance where political 
malfunction does not otherwise seem severe or the limitations on the 
judiciary would otherwise appear daunting. But it is still the balance 
of all of these factors considered together which is determinative. 
That protection of political speech and the press help to correct 
political malfunction explains why protection of speech and the press 
is important, but not why judicial protection, as opposed to political 
protection, is important. If the political process can adequately pro-
tect speech and press, judicial protection is not needed. Is there polit-
ical malfunction associated with this protection? Ely suggests what he 
calls the "in/out" bias: those in power wishing to stay in power sup-
press criticism in order to do so. 
Such a conception of malfunction, although sensible at first glance, 
misses the systemic nature of the political process by focusing only on 
the most immediate actors - a tendency of Ely's which we saw ear-
lier. 99 Those in office might like to do many things ranging from em-
bezzlement of public funds to the exclusive use of government facilities 
for themselves and their friends. Whether they can do so, however, 
depends on the behavior of the political system as a whole. The "ins" 
bias Ely suggests must be supplemented by some reason why the desire 
of those in office to suppress criticism will not be countered within the 
political process itself. 
In some instances, suppression of political speech and press can 
carry serious political consequences. Pervasive censorship might incur 
the wrath of the powerful media - a source of information to the 
dormant majority - or anger large numbers of citizens. Suppression 
98. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Pentagon Papers case), is a 
prime example. See text following note 101 infra. 
99. See discussion of Ely's "motivation" theory of political malfunction in Part 11.B supra. 
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of the views of the Democratic Party by a Republican Administration 
seems a politically dangerous step which would be done infrequently 
even without judicial protection. 
But there are two quite different instances in which the political 
process as a whole offers little threat to officeholders bent on sup-
pressing expression. Not surprisingly they involve either majoritarian 
or minoritarian bias. Censorship often suppresses unpopular political 
messages rather than political messages immediately dangerous to the 
political officeholders. It has been the Communist Party or some 
other fringe group, not the Democratic or Republican Party, which 
has most often been censored. In such instances, the "ins" do not feel 
compelled to hide from the public their suppression of unwelcome ex-
pression. Here the political views of dissidents can be suppressed be-
cause the general public would not feel harmed - indeed they would 
feel benefited. To the extent that this censorship benefits a low-impact 
majority while iij.tensely harming a small minority, we again have the 
conditions for majoritarian bias. 100 
The presence of a low-impact majority also raises the distinct pos-
sibility of minoritarian bias. The public may be generally benefited by 
the free exchange of ideas. But as with government regulation of the 
market in goods and services - the classic examples of minoritarian 
bias - each regulation has only a very small impact on a given indi-
vidual. Such an individual has little incentive to investigate and un-
derstand the regulation in question and may even be convinced that 
the regulation in question is beneficial. The detriment to citizens, 
although small from any one regulation, is substantial when summed 
over all regulations. Where a concentrated minority such as office-
holders favors suppression of ideas, we have the conditions for severe 
minoritarian bias. This minoritarian bias and the majoritarian bias 
just discussed provide the systemic grounds for political malfunction 
missing in Ely's "in/out" analysis. 
Analyzing the judicial response to the protection of expression also 
requires consideration of the costs of that protection. Constitutional 
review of these regulations of expression is an imposing task. Regula-
tion of expression confronts the courts with subject matter of varying 
difficulty ranging from traffic control to national security and with re-
straints on expression of varying degrees ranging from complete sup-
pression via prior restraints to limited controls on the manner of 
delivering the message. 
100. Majoritarian bias and first amendment protection of nonpolitical speech are discussed in 
note 129 infra. 
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Some cases severely test the ability of the courts. In the Pentagon 
Papers case, 101 for example, the government claimed dire conse-
quences for international relations, national security, and the execu-
tion of an ongoing (if undeclared) war unless publication of the 
material in question was suppressed. Assessing such claims confronts 
the courts with strains on their ability, a fact not lost on government 
lawyers. The risks raised by the government's claims are both very 
great and very difficult for the courts to gauge. 
The Pentagon Papers case dramatically reveals the tensions cre-
ated when severe suspicion of the political process shows up in the 
same context as severe limitations on judicial ability. Although prior 
restraint of political speech is traditionally the most suspect form of 
constraint on expression, only three Justices declared governmental at-
tempts at such suppression generally invalid. The remaining three ma-
jority Justices voted to invalidate the particular prior restraint 
involved because of the absence of either a congressional statute or a 
presidential regulation. As such, these three swing Justices were al-
lowing the political processes to dictate those circumstances in which 
the dangers to national security would be great enough to justify prior 
restraint, in effect reallocating the decision back to a political process 
whose determinations about political expression are usually subject to 
substantial suspicion. 
Thus, even though protection of expression possesses special po-
tential to correct political malfunction, defining the judicial role in 
that protection requires analysis of both political malfunction and ju-
dicial capacity. We can expect variations in the degree to which the 
judiciary reviews and remakes governmental regulation of expression 
based on these factors. 
Access to the vote and the reapportionment of legislative districts 
are clearly issues directly connected to the political process. Arguably 
this connection provides a potential for correction of political mal-
function so great that it does not take much in the way of political 
malfunction or judicial capacity to make out a case for judicial inter-
vention. In fact, there are ample reasons to suppose that the political 
process suffers from serious malfunction in the determination of voting 
questions and that these issues are tractable for the courts. 
In the case of voting and redistricting, the "ins" bias has a valid 
claim as a sufficient condition for political malfunction. A state legis-
lature, elected by a distorted voter base, is well positioned to preserve 
that base since those who can vote them out are precisely those voters 
101. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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who benefit from the distortion. (In this instance, the "ins" constitute 
not only those in office but also those who put them there and who 
have the votes to throw them out.) 
The Supreme Court appears to have adopted this view in its reap-
portionment cases. 102 Moreover, it has limited the resource costs of 
intervention by employing a sweeping solution: one person, one vote. 
This simple approach sidestepped the intractable process of balancing 
such concerns as population, land mass, and tradition. Like other 
sweeping solutions, the one person, one vote rule came at the cost of 
some arbitrariness since the criteria which were suppressed have rele-
vance.103 We will return to this subject shortly. But this sweeping 
solution had the ring of general principle and allowed the judiciary to 
take on issues which had significant potential to indirectly correct 
political malfunction. 
Thus, the attraction of such political process correction as protec-
tion of political expression and access to the vote can be joined with a 
strong case for the need for judicial protection. There remain, how-
ever, important questions of just how this correction takes place and 
how it operates in response to majoritarian and minoritarian bias. 
These process corrections all aim at making information, organiza-
tion, or the vote more generally accessible. As such, they decrease the 
relative advantage of concentrated interests who trade upon their su-
periority in gathering information, organizing, and gaining access to 
power through nonvoting channels. But what perfects the process vis-
a-vis minoritarian bias may do little for and, in fact, aggravate 
majoritarian bias. Government bureaucrats whose manipulations of 
programs reflect the will of a majority have little to fear from public 
exposure or an expanded franchise. Majoritarian bias is generated 
when simple democracy works too well. The majority knows its inter-
est and votes it. Because that interest is unweighted, however, a mi-
nority suffers substantial losses for disproportionately small gains to 
the majority. 
Thus, judicial responses like the basic rule of American voting 
rights - one person, one vote - are well suited to the dissipation of 
minoritarian bias. But this emphasis on pure majoritarianism can re-
enforce majoritarian bias. In the extreme, if it were possible to fully 
perfect the process by making every citizen totally aware of his or her 
own interest and able to translate immediately that interest into an 
effective vote, minoritarian bias would disappear, but majoritarian bias 
102. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
10~, Consider the sorts of factors discussed by Justice Harlan, dissenting in Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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would be worse.104 
Examined from this perspective, the various components of 
Carolene Products - the holding of the case and the principal con-
cerns expressed in the footnote - are very much interrelated. The 
holding abandons serious judicial review of economic regulation, 
thereby leaving dispersed majorities like consumers unprotected from 
the minoritarian bias which often characterizes governmental deci-
sions about economic regulation. However, paragraph two of the 
Carolene Products footnote promises indirect aid to these dispersed 
majorities by strengthening their access to and participation in the 
political process. There remains the question of protecting against 
majoritarian bias which is uncorrected and perhaps even aggravated 
by the protection of paragraph two. Paragraph three of the footnote 
responds by promising special judicial examination of those actions 
most likely infected by majoritarian bias. 
In brief, it appears that the Carolene Products Court's concern for 
protection of discrete and insular minorities was correct and remains 
so. Minoritarian bias is lessened by judicial protection which opens 
the political process. But majoritarian bias is not. In general, the 
courts can address majoritarian bias only by the continued case-by-
case substitution of judicial decisions for decisions made by the defec-
tive political process. 
The structural characteristics of adjudication discussed earlier105 
also make the judiciary a better candidate for protection of concen-
trated minorities than for protection of dispersed majorities. The 
worst instances of minoritarian bias involve highly dispersed and dor-
mant majorities such as consumers and taxpayers. Because of the 
costs of information and organization, these groups are unlikely to be 
able to organize and finance litigation. The victims of majoritarian 
bias, on the other hand, should find the organization of litigation eas-
ier. These are identifiable and often concentrated victims. A judicial 
104. Compare the following observations on the use and abuse of the modern media: 
Before the day of the big-circulation newspaper, the radio, and television there was usu-
ally little likelihood that information or sensation produced by legislative inquiry would 
reach beyond the capital city .... [P]owerful tendencies worked toward political apathy and 
despair; individuals felt cut off from understanding the social currents that tossed their lives, 
lost confidence that they could significantly affect what happened to them, had difficulty in 
perceiving where common interests lay. This setting created a constructive role for legisla-
tive inquiry directed at informing public opinion, and even at arousing public worry, anger, 
or urgent demand. But the availability of the new mass audience was tempting to ruthless 
political ambition. Armed with committee subpoena powers, a headline-hunting legislator 
now could find a new avenue to personal power ... at whatever expense to individuals or 
groups pilloried by his shrewd manipulation of damaging testimony. 
J. HURST, supra note 34, at 125. 
105. See Part III.A.2 supra. 
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process structured for easier minority access is, therefore, more hospi-
table than a majoritarian political process. 
The analysis of the effect of process correction on the two polar 
biases and the associated case for judicial focus on majoritarian bias is 
subject to some qualification. Even if these process corrections operate 
against minoritarian bias, they hardly remove it. Courts occasionally 
still react to this potential for minoritarian bias by direct scrutiny and 
invalidation of legislation thought infected by it. 106 
It is also possible to imagine situations in which improved political 
interchange might decrease majoritarian bias. If this improved in-
terchange made the majority feel more sympathetic to the minority's 
interest, there would be an alleviation of majoritarian bias. It was 
hoped, for example, that the racial integration of schools might im-
prove relations between black and white children and decrease the 
effectiveness of old stereotypes (simple symbols). If increased in-
terchange also was to increase interaction and interdependence be-
tween members of the majority and the minority, it would become 
increasingly difficult to tailor government action which safely targeted 
only the minority. 
Even given these qualifications, however, judicial activity in direct 
reaction to majoritarian bias seems both more necessary and more fea-
sible given the greater possibility that majoritarian bias will survive 
judicial correction of the political process and the greater chance that 
minority claims will be represented in the judicial process. Although 
these are admittedly only rough tendencies, such insights are impor-
tant in an analysis as constrained and approximate as that which the 
judiciary must undertake. 
2. Direct Review, Majoritarian Bias, and Well-Defined Minorities 
As we have seen, majoritarian bias in particular survives well (per-
haps flourishes) in an open, majoritarian system. In some instances of 
severe majoritarian bias and for some social issues, the courts have 
assumed the obligations of review and redecision. This has especially 
been the case where severe majoritarian bias is associated with identifi-
able, traditional minorities. We earlier connected the characteristics 
of those minorities traditionally protected in constitutional law and 
the characteristics of majoritarian bias set out here. 107 Identifying im-
106. See note 129 infra. 
107. See Part 11.B.3 supra. There we linked the discreteness, insularity, and immutability of 
these minorities with the attributes of majoritarian bias - a highly burdened minority and a low-
impact yet politically active majority. Such minorities are safe targets for these burdens because 
they can be easily identified and localized (discrete and insular), and are otherwise unlikely to 
enter the majority or be entered by members of the majority (immutable). Activating an other-
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portant sources of political malfunction, however, is only part of the 
case for judicial protection of minorities. Determining judicial protec-
tion also requires consideration of the difficulties or costs of that pro-
tection and a careful match between political malfunction and judicial 
response. 108 
Judicial protection of these traditional groups takes a wide variety 
of forms and degrees of strength, reflecting variations in the severity of 
political malfunction and the costs of judicial response. As foreshad-
owed by the language of the Carolene Products footnote, the prime 
examples of judicial protection of minorities appear in cases dealing 
with race. The courts have doggedly pursued racial desegregation of 
public facilities, and in particular the public schools. Modem equal 
protection jurisprudence - suspect classification and two-tiered scru-
tiny - was forged in race cases. 
From an institutional perspective, it is easy to understand why race 
is the classic suspect classification. Racial minorities are safe targets. 
They are usually physically distinct and often geographically local-
ized. It is virtually impossible to leave or enter a racial category. The 
dismal political history of nonwhites has seen them excluded from vot-
ing by law and later by local practice. 
Yet even the judicial treatment of race has not been straightfor-
ward or uniform. There are variations in the degree to which racial 
classifications are reviewed by the courts. These variations within the 
race cases can also be seen as the product of underlying variations in 
the basic institutional factors of political malfunction and judicial 
capacity. 
On one level, racial classifications have been relatively easy for the 
courts to handle. Where express racial classifications are involved and 
operate to the detriment of racial minorities, the courts are often in a 
position to employ sweeping solutions which simply forbid the polit-
ical process any use of racial classifications. Government officials have 
usually justified such racial classifications as means of preventing ra-
wise dormant low-impact majority is easier when the societal issue can be cast in simple and 
traditional terms - like race, alienage, and gender - with which members of that majority can 
easily identify. 
108. As a general matter, the existence of well-defined, traditional groups probably increases 
the prospects of protection by reducing the difficulty of formulating and implementing judicial 
response. Courts constrained in their ability to recognize majoritarian bias and to administer the 
associated system of protection predictably focus on easily definable, traditional groups with a 
recognized history of abuse by political processes. As a matter of description, one can expect 
that less easily defined or traditional minorities will face a more difficult time winning protection. 
Such minorities would face the significant task of educating the courts on their plight. This 
suggestion comes from my colleague Bill Clune, who argues that the most powerless minorities 
might simply go unnoticed by the courts. 
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cial violence, unrest, and tension. These justifications have been re-
jected by the courts long before the modem era of equal protection 109 
and continue to meet similar sweeping rejection.110 This sweeping re-
jection of racial classifications, at least where they operate to the detri-
ment of minorities, seems to be the product of the small range of valid 
use and the significant chance of misuse by the government combined 
with the difficulty of the courts in discerning between valid and invalid 
use. 
It would, for example, be simple minded to suggest that racial ten-
sion is not a reality and a danger which a perfect societal deci-
sionmaker could consider. The white child in Palmore v. Sidotl 111 
raised by her white mother and her black stepfather, could be the tar-
get of significant prejudice and derision. Why should a state family 
law court assigned the task of protecting the interests of this child be 
precluded from considering these effects in its custody decision? 
Much of the answer lies in the high probability of misuse of such crite-
ria by the highly imperfect political process. The government's justifi-
cation itself highlights the existence of the conditions for majoritarian 
bias. It shows that race is a conscious criterion for members of the 
majority and that, therefore, the majority is unlikely to be dormant 
here. Where the existence of racial tension can be used as a factor in 
taking a child from a white mother who marries a black man, there is 
a significant chance that this factor will be overweighed by the polit-
ical process with little weight given to the needs or interests of mem-
bers of a racial minority or those who marry them. The Court simply 
cannot trust that the classification would be aptly applied nor is it able 
to make the necessary distinctions itself. The costs of a sweeping solu-
tion here seem justifiably low, although not zero.112 
But such relatively easy solutions hardly characterize all of the ra-
cial issues which have faced or will face the courts. In some instances, 
greater difficulty has produced greater judicial involvement. Thus, for 
109. E.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
110. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
111. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
112. The Palmore Court claimed that any consideration of racial tension in the custody deci-
sion was impermissible because it gave official recognition to this wrongful social phenomenon. 
Such an argument implies that racial tension could not be considered even where the result was 
favorable to the minority. That argument would neglect the much lower chance of political 
malfunction where a pro-minority determination is involved. 
Notwithstanding the Court's assertion, it seems likely that the result in Palmore would have 
been different if the family court judge had considered the same racial tension as reason for 
increasing the child support owed by the white father in order to allow the child to attend private 
school or receive special counseling. This result is consistent with the analysis of reverse discrim-
ination presented subsequently. See text at notes 120-24 infra. 
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enmple, the treatment of racial bias in public education has seen ag-
gressive judicial intervention in the face of difficult societal policy deci-
sions. Education is both important and complex. Vast amounts of 
public funds are expended on public education and huge administra-
tive networks chum out a wide variety of educational decisions. For-
mulation and execution of educational policy is often controversial 
and difficult. The courts cannot easily treat school desegregation with 
simple formulae and sweeping solutions. Racial desegregation cannot 
be easily separated from issues like staffing, organization, funding, and 
educational philosophy. In addition, strong opposition to desegrega-
tion by the white majority creates a political advantage for govern-
mental officials in resisting court action which, in tum, means more 
court action in order to oversee and administer previous judicial 
orders. 
Despite substantial and continuing outlays of judicial resources 
and significant criticism, the federal courts have generally resisted the 
pressures toward timidity in school desegregation. The involvement of 
the courts has been substantial and far reaching, spawning innovative 
administrative techniques to allow district courts to cope with a re-
sponsibility which forces them to supervise ongoing educational deci-
sions for long periods of time. m 
But, even in connection with race, the courts have not always or 
even usually been so tenacious when faced with significant strains on 
their resources and capability. A major example of timidity is the 
court's general response to implicit racial classification. Invalidating 
only express racial classifications often provides very little protection 
for minorities. A political process pushed by active majorities can 
trample the interests of politically weak minorities without recourse to 
explicit racial classifications. Severe harm can be hidden in the folds 
of complex but important government activity such as educational ad-
ministration and land use planning. 
The courts have severely controlled their role in most complex so-
cial programs by limiting their pursuit of implicit racial classifications 
through the use of a motive or purpose test. In Washington v. Davis 114 
the Court announced that it would not accept disproportionate racial 
impact as a sufficient test for the presence of racial classification and, 
therefore, for serious judicial intervention. Instead, it required a 
showing that the relevant governmental officials had been motivated 
by illicit racial concerns. 
113. See M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 85. 
114. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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Earlier I argued that it was a mistake to base the definition of polit-
ical malfunction on the intent, motive, or purpose of government offi-
cials. Evil mental states are neither necessary nor sufficient to the 
conceptions of political malfunction employed in this article. To the 
extent that this motive test reflects the Court's perception of political 
malfunction, my earlier criticism of Ely's similar position applies to 
the Court: motive or purpose are poor indicators of political 
maJfunction.115 
There are several indications, however, that the Court's emphasis 
on motivation actually reflects concerns about its own limitations as a 
decisionmaker. First, the Court's relevant opinions emphasize judicial 
limitations. In Washington v. Davis, Justice White's majority opinion 
emphasized the dire implications of employing an impact standard. 
He pointed to the correlation between income and race and the signifi-
cant chance that even legislation intended to aid the poor might harm 
them. 116 According to this view, the courts would have been forced to 
apply strict scrutiny to a vast, ill-defined, and complex set of social 
legislation. 
Second, the Court's use of the motive test vacillates, following a 
pattern which seems always to limit the judicial role. Before Davis, the 
federal courts had supposed that disproportionate impact was the test. 
In at least two prominent cases before Davis, the Court had appeared 
to reject motive tests. In Palmer v. Thompson 117 the Court refused to 
find unconstitutional the closing of a public swimming pool even 
though the closing was clearly carried out for racial motivations. The 
Court there pointed to the absence of disproportionate impact. In 
United States v. O'Brien 118 the Court refused to consider evidence of 
the mental states of the legislators to show that federal legislation for-
bidding the destruction of selective service cards was intended to stop 
demonstrations against the war in Vietnam. 
One common element in these conflicting pronouncements is that 
the scope of constitutional rights and of judicial action is consistently 
controlled. Motivation is required in Davis and the judicial role is lim-
ited. Impact is required in Palmer and the judicial role is limited. 
Motivation is declared not relevant in O'Brien and the judicial role is 
limited. One need not be cynical to see the Court's concern about the 
limits of the judiciary. 
There is no doubt that the Court had to find a way to confine those 
115. See Part II.C supra. 
116. 426 U.S. at 248. 
117. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
118. 391 U.S. 367, 383·84 (1968) .. 
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issues which would be regarded as racial and which would, therefore, 
receive serious judicial attention. Virtually any governmental decision 
has differential impacts, and often these impacts fall differently on dif-
ferent income groups. Many programs have a regressive distributive 
effect. Moreover, the correlation between race and income is substan-
tial. Thus, there are grounds for Justice White's fears, expressed in 
Washington v. Davis, that a racial impact test could place far too great 
a demand on the courts. 
A motive or purpose test looks like a neat tool to limit this de-
mand. It has the appearance of a principle related to basic concep-
tions of political malfunction. It may even be a rough indicator of 
political malfunction. Where race is discussed by decisionmakers or 
otherwise appears to be a conscious consideration, it may be more 
likely that majoritarian bias rather than minoritarian bias is present. 
It is second nature to speak of legislation in terms of purpose. 
Viewed more carefully, however, the test is neither easy to apply 
nor a good representation of political malfunction. In most contexts, 
the numbers of official governmental decisionmakers alone swamps re-
alistic attempts to define collective intent. The Court has shown itself 
ambivalent about using the test for decisionmaking institutions of 
more than a few members. Identifying the intentions of large legisla-
tures, let alone statewide referenda, poses serious conceptual 
problems. 119 More importantly, reliance on intent as the sole criterion 
for distrust of the political process focuses on the wrong aspects of 
political decisionmaking. It ignores the structure of decisionmaking, 
the configuration of voting strength, and the undue influence of organ-
ized minorities or nondormant majorities. The absence of these cen-
tral features diminishes the relevance of inquiries about the mindset of 
legislators and administrators. 
It would seem better for the courts to resurrect an impact test and 
limit the judicial role by such criteria as the severity and directness of 
that impact. Directness could be determined by asking whether it was 
reasonable to assume that the severe impact would be generally recog-
nized or expected at the time the legislation was passed. Such a test 
removes the need to scrutinize the actual debates or conversations and 
119. O'Brien reflects the limits of Davis when it is applied to a large body of decisionmakers. 
In Davis and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Haus. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (further 
articulating the Davis standard), the governmental decisionmaking bodies were small - city 
councils or administrative agencies. What is the rule when the entity is as large as a state legisla· 
ture or Congress? The enduring problem of defining collective intent or purpose already inherent 
in Davis and Arlington Heights is significant here. See Back to the Future, supra note 8, at 203-10. 
Most representatives are unlikely to express motivation or purpose and there are likely to be a 
multiplicity of purposes. 
February 1988] A Job for the Judges 711 
to define collective intent. It also broadens the focus of inquiry beyond 
immediate government officials thereby recognizing the systemic na-
ture of political malfunction. At the same time, however, the test 
would allow the courts to limit the degree to which they must track 
racial impact through the tangle of ever more indirect interactions 
with other social factors. 
The treatment of implicit racial classifications is not the only ex-
ample of major variation in the degree of judicial intervention on race 
issues. Explicit racial classifications aiding racial minorities have also 
been treated differently from those harming racial minorities. The 
Court has upheld affirmative action programs despite the presence of 
explicit racial classifications and claims by members of the Court that 
the same standard of strict scrutiny is applicable to any explicit 
classification. 120 
Whatever the claims of these Justices, the scrutiny actually applied 
to these reverse discrimination cases operates much differently in prac-
tice. For over forty years the presence of explicit racial classifications 
signaled the application of a strict scrutiny standard which has always 
been fatal. In many instances, the legislation struck down had been 
justified as a reaction to racial prejudice and tension. 121 The Court has 
allowed the existence of this racial prejudice and tension to justify the 
use of racial criteria only in the context of programs in which the ben-
efited are members of racial minorities and the burdened are members 
of racial majorities. 
The analysis proposed in this article endorses a diminished judicial 
role in these reverse discrimination cases. Although majoritarian bias 
makes government action which harms racial minorities severely sus-
pect, government action which harms racial majorities is not subject to 
the same bias. On a simple level, such action is an example of 
counterbias - an instance in which a decision runs against the sys-
temic bias. As indicated earlier, the existence of a malfunction or bias 
does not mean that all results will be contrary to the underrepresented 
group; they will just occur less often. These counterbias results occur 
120. Four major racial affirmative action cases have been decided by the Supreme Court on 
constitutional grounds. In two, United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), and Fullilove 
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court declared the program in question valid. In two, 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 
476 U.S. 267 (1986), the Court declared the program in question invalid. There also have been 
two instances in which the Court has approved affirmative action plans against,claims that they 
violated civil rights legislation prohibiting racial discrimination. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 
443 U.S. 193 (1979); Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). It disap-
proved such a plan in Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). 
121. E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), discussed in note 112 supra and accompa-
nying text. 
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despite a malfunction not because of one. Thus, at least at a simple 
level of analysis, there is no need for the review and remaking of such 
governmental decisions by the judiciary. A very low standard of scru-
tiny is needed. 
This simple analysis, however, requires qualification. Reasons exist 
to distrust the political process in the context of reverse discrimina-
tion. Despite claims of reverse discrimination, a program can be em-
ployed to harm the minority in question. The racial minority may be 
harmed and the majority aided and that effect hidden in the folds of a 
complex program. Similarly, one racial or ethnic minority may be 
aided to the direct detriment of another. 122 The presence of 
majoritarian bias should make the courts wary of such outcomes. 
Counterbias operates to reduce distrust only when the politically more 
powerful group carries the burden. 
But a more sweeping claim of bias can be connected to reverse 
discrimination. No government program generates effects which fall 
uniformly on all members of large aggregates like racial minorities or 
majorities. The detriments of reverse discrimination programs do not 
fall on all whites. Instead they fall on that small group of whites who 
are denied access to the benefits of the program - admission to medi-
cal school, access to government contracts, and access to government 
jobs. These are groups with small numbers. On what grounds do we 
suppose that the interests of this small group is adequately represented 
(let alone, overrepresented) in the political process?123 
The answer to this question lies in the realities of judicial review. 
Only the most severe and lasting political malfunctions can be claimed 
as the basis of judicial intervention. Most government programs - at 
least viewed in isolation - have a detrimental impact on only a small 
group. The small minority of whites are almost certainly not perfectly 
represented in the political processes which produced the affirmative 
action programs in question. But that small group lacks the charac-
teristics we have associated with severe majoritarian bias. 
Those characteristics were a low-impact but still politically active 
majority, and a.severely harmed minority. In tum, that meant that 
the minority in question must be a safe target because members of the 
majority would not want to run a serious risk of slipping into the se-
verely harmed category. There is little reason to believe that the ma-
jority of whites, although immediately unharmed by affirmative action 
programs, could feel comfortable that they faced little or no risk of 
122. These cautions about reverse discrimination were articulated by Justice Brennan in his 
concurring opinion in Carey, 430 U.S. at 172-76. 
123. Justice Scalia uses this sort of argument in his dissent in Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1472-76. 
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falling into the harmed category. As the number of affirmative action 
plans has grown, so has the chance that present or future programs 
will impact a large number of whites.124 
The political processes which fashion affirmative action programs 
are not even close to perfect. But that is the situation for virtually all 
governmental decisions. Much stronger indications of intractable bias 
are necessary before judicial intervention can be justified, especially in 
so difficult and complex a field. By the analysis employed here, unless 
such a case is made the decision should remain with the political 
process. 
Various other identifiable groups besides racial, religious, and eth-
nic minorities have received some degree of judicial protection. Here 
we will consider two of these groups - women and the poor - both 
because they have received significant attention from constitutional 
analysts and because the institutional analysis of judicial protection 
differs significantly between the two groups as well as between them 
and racial minorities. 
Gender is a classification never officially termed suspect by the 
Court but which nonetheless has received heightened scrutiny (even 
before it was called heightened scrutiny). Many factors in our analysis 
favor the vision that women are likely targets of political malfunction. 
Gender classifications are immutable in both senses of that term. Gen-
der is the oldest and most traditional distinction - the simplest of 
symbols, as likely to produce immediate reactions as race and religion. 
Women were excluded from the vote for most of our history. Gender 
is a discrete, bifurcated classification with easier identification even 
than race. There are many racial minorities and restrictions on one 
race may become restrictions on another. There are only two genders; 
in that sense, gender is more discrete than race. 
There are, however, two elements which may decrease the force of 
the case for judicial protection of women from majoritarian bias. The 
most obvious is that women are not a minority. Women have the po-
tential for significant voting strength. Women are also not insular. 
Women regularly interact with men in the household, in the school, 
124. It is also possible to argue that minoritarian bias prevails. Racial minorities can be 
effective special interests. They are often instrumental in the passage of affirmative action plans 
- although in many instances their influence is felt through their threat to use the courts rather 
than direct influence in the political process. But again the question is whether affirmative action 
plans are a context for minoritarian bias extreme enough to call for judicial replacement of the 
political process. Minoritarian bias is most severe when the low-impact majority would likely 
ignore the issue involved because that issue is unfamiliar and inaccessible. Affirmative action 
issues do not readily fall into that category. Such plans receive substantial attention in the media 
because they interest people. Although concentrated racial minorities have been politically effec-
tive, affirmative action is not likely to be a fruitful context for long-term minoritarian bias. 
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and in the general community. As such, there is a significant chance 
that the negative impact of laws on women will have negative spillover 
effects on men. To that extent, women may not be safe targets. 
This lack of insularity, however, can also be seen as a disadvantage 
for women. As Ackerman has argued, the dispersion of women may 
make organization more difficult. 125 On an even more subtle level, the 
interactions between men and women may not always or perhaps even 
usually produce empathetic relations with men. They may form con-
texts in which the interests of women are suppressed in favor of men. 
This is the world which feminists, in particular, have presented. 126 If 
the lack of insularity does not work to increase the positive interdepen-
dence of men and women, women remain the safe target that their 
physical immutability dictates, although their large numbers give 
them a political potential not shared by other safe targets. 
This more complex picture of the treatment of women in the polit-
ical process stands as a general reminder that the analytical constructs 
employed here, like all such intellectual devices, cannot capture the 
full texture of reality. Their application in any given area remains sub-
ject to review and debate. Yet they are valuable as a first cut at ques-
tions of institutional analysis and provide a framework which can help 
us understand the judicial treatment of even so difficult an area as gen-
der discrimination. 
From this vantage, the judicial approach to gender discrimination 
seems to be built not on fear of an overpowering majoritarian bias but 
rather the presence of a workable combination of minoritarian bias 
and ease of administration. Women can easily be seen as a dormant 
majority. Many laws employing gender classification exclude women 
from occupations or business. Such exclusions are typical of economic 
regulations by which concentrated groups seek to limit competition in 
general. These exclusions are aided in the gender setting by common 
stereotypes about women. 
On the other hand, women would seem to have a less potent claim 
of minoritarian bias than other dormant majorities, such as consumers 
and taxpayers. That women are a discrete group tends to reduce the 
likelihood of dormancy. Discreteness, a disadvantage for a minority 
against majoritarian bias, is an advantage for a majority against mi-
noritarian bias. 
Discreteness here, however, can serve as an advantage for judicial 
125. See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 729, 742. 
126. See, e.g., c. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); c. MACKINNON, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professio11a/ Lall• 
guage, and Legal Change, 101 HARV. L. REV. (1988) (forthcoming). 
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intervention because it makes intervention easier - so long as the 
courts do not search much beyond explicit classifications. At least as 
to express gender categories, sweeping solutions seem quite usable. 
These classifications can be struck down with little loss. Gender is 
usually justified as a rough approximation of some other characteristic 
such as strength. More direct tests are usually available thereby de-
creasing the need for gender as an approximation. 
The Court has taken a "low cost" approach to gender discrimina-
tion by scrutinizing gender classifications only so long as they are ex-
plicit and do not force the Court to confront difficult substantive areas. 
When, however, the legislation raises the prospect of greater expense, 
either by going beyond explicit gender classifications or by raising 
questions of gender equality in difficult substantive contexts, the Court 
seems to make an abrupt halt. The Court has taken a largely mechani-
cal approach, striking down virtually all express gender classifications 
and ignoring implicit classifications even where the implications were 
very strong.127 Even an attenuated threat of facing traditionally diffi-
cult subject matter seems to have caused the Court to back off from 
serious scrutiny of the congressional exclusion of women from the re-
quirement to register for the military draft. 128 Such timidity again 
reveals a limited judicial commitment to scrutiny of gender classifica-
tions. Judicial reaction to gender discrimination, like the reaction to 
commercial speech and some laws reviewed under the dormant com-
merce clause, may only be a small scale incursion against minoritarian 
bias made tractable by the limits of constitutional doctrines designed 
for other purposes.129 
The case for judicial protection of the poor, another of Ackerman's 
127. An extreme example is Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), where the Court re-
fused to see a gender classification in the exclusion of pregnancy from California's employee 
disability insurance coverage. 
128. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
129. A deep distrust for minoritarian bias continuously prompts limited judicial reactions 
against it. On isolated occasions, both the Warren and Burger Courts have been tempted back to 
direct scrutiny ofminoritarian bias. In Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), the Warren Court 
struck down an Illinois statute which placed requirements on all financial institutions except one, 
American Express. 
Although the Burger Court subsequently overruled Morey in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 
297 (1976), it built its own havens for direct review of minoritarian bias. The most obvious of 
these is commercial speech. Until recently, commercial speech had been excluded from the rig-
orous protection accorded speech in general. Precedent certainly did not compel the Burger 
Court to extend protection here. The first amendment, however, provides a convenient haven for 
direct judicial reaction to minoritarian bias. 
Suppression of competition in the guise of consumer protection is the classic form of mi-
noritarian bias. One standard way to control competition is restriction of advertising. Although 
restriction of advertising is neither the most frequent nor the most flagrant form of control on 
competition perpetuated by special interests, the special nature of speech established by the first 
amendment (on other grounds) provides a convenient (if arbitrary) limit which allows the courts 
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examples, 130 is quite different from the case for protection of women. 
Here, although there may be stronger reasons for protection, there are 
far more problems in providing it. Unlike women, the poor by most 
definitions are far from a majority of the nation, of any state, or even 
of most locales. Poverty is often associated with low education and 
transience. The rate of participation in the political process is signifi-
cantly lower for the poor than the nonpoor. 
The poor are dispersed and diffuse in quite a different sense than 
women and with quite different effects. Although the poor may be 
dispersed geographically in the sense that poverty exists throughout 
the nation, they are in many instances geographically isolated. The 
urban poor are likely to be concentrated in certain neighborhoods in 
the center city, seldom in the suburbs. They can be easily targeted 
geographically, and since they have very little interaction with the 
more affiuent there will be little spillover, which adds to the ease of 
targeting. Zoning laws can increase income segregation; often that is 
their purpose. Income segregation aids easy targeting. 
The only factor arguing against considering the poor a discrete mi-
nority is that poverty is not immutable - at least in theory. The poor 
become nonpoor and vice versa. It is unlikely, however, that many 
nonpoor will become poor and, therefore, the poor are relatively safe 
targets. 131 
to cut off the indistinguishable mass of regulation which would swamp the courts' abilities and 
resources. 
The federal courts also actively review legislation subject to minoritarian bias under the ru· 
bric of the dormant commerce clause. It is common to see political malfunction here in the 
absence of representation of outside interests in the state. On this theory, interstate commerce 
needs judicial protection because the harms of regulation fall on those outside the state. In some 
instances, it is accurate to find the losers from such restrictions out of state and the winners in 
state. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
Many dormant commerce clause cases, however, involve restrictions on out-of-state competi-
tion with in-state sellers. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commn., 432 U.S. 333 
(1977). Like any restrictions on competition, the losers include the consumers of the restricted 
product and, in these cases, those are in-state consumers. If such state laws suffer from political 
malfunction, it is minoritarian bias. The problem is not the absence of an in-state interest which 
might bear loss. The problem is the absence of activity by such a group. The major losers from 
restrictions on competition - whether in-state or out-of-state competition - are in-state con-
sumers. As such, the dormant commerce clause, with its ostensible interest in bias against out-
of-state interests, hosts a subset of the more pervasive minoritarian bias. Like commercial 
speech, the conventional rubric allows for a convenient cutoff from the mass of government 
actions subject to minoritarian bias. 
130. See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 729, 739. 
131. Such an assertion, of course, depends on the definition of "poor." Poverty and indi-
gence are defined in a number of ways. Yet even given a generous definition of poverty, the 
probability that most nonpoor would become poor seems low. 
The only relevant study of which I am aware indicates that, based on data from the 1970s, 
there is less than an 8% chance that someone in the upper 60% of the income distribution would 
fall into the lowest 20% of that distribution over a seven-year period. G. DUNCAN, YEARS OF 
POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY, 12-14 (1984). The upper limit of this lowest twenty percent is 
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There is, then, a strong case that the poor suffer significant 
majoritarian bias. The major problem with protecting the poor lies in 
the difficulties of providing that protection. Review of legislation af-
fecting the poor poses issues of income redistribution. This topic lies 
at the core of social decisionmaking and arises in virtually every sub-
stantive setting. Where legislation (or legislative inaction) directly con-
fronts income redistribution, the courts are competing with the 
political process for one of the most pervasive and controversial social 
issues. Virtually all laws redistribute income to some degree; tax laws 
and welfare laws are only the most obvious examples. It is very diffi-
cult to imagine that serious review could take the form of sweeping 
solutions. Without a confining strategy, the judicial role could easily 
exceed its physical capacity and substantive competence. 
The Supreme Court has made overtures of protection for the poor. 
But it has narrowed that protection severely by confining itself to the 
impact on the indigent of only a small range of substantive issues and 
government actions. These government actions have usually involved 
access of the poor to the courts and the political process (voting). 
Courts have confined their role through the curious doctrine of funda-
mental rights. 132 Even here the courts have refused to review seriously 
large-scale, controversial funding bills which can pervasively affect 
fundamental rights, 133 while invalidating more idiosyncratic and nar-
row government actions. 134 
Because of serious vulnerability to majoritarian bias, the poor need 
judicial protection. But the challenge for proponents of that protec-
tion is to define a strategy which will allow the courts to review some 
important government actions without facing the full range of distrib-
utive questions. 
The existing constitutional decisions examined thus far have gener-
ally followed a pattern at least roughly consistent with the institutional 
framework suggested in this article. Whether one agrees or disagrees 
with the outcomes or the reasoning of these cases, one can recognize 
the pattern; any differences seem to fall within a disputable range of 
institutional assumptions. Normative assertions made thus far have 
called for improved institutional results. 
approximately thirty-five percent above the official poverty level, providing a broad definition of 
"poor." Presumably, if one used the official poverty level to define "poor," the probability of 
members of the majority of nonpoor becoming poor would be significantly lower. 
132. We will discuss this doctrine at notes \136-38 infra and the accompanying text. 
133. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (abortion funding). 
134. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating a state law which effectively 
prohibited an indigent from marrying until he had satisfied prior child support payments). 
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But this sanguine mood does not always prevail and seems cer-
tainly broken by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bowers v. 
Hardwick 135 In that case, the Court carried fundamental-rights rea-
soning to an institutionally perverse conclusion. According to that rea-
soning, the singling out of an insular, discrete minority for derogatory 
treatment was a virtue which increased the constitutional validity of 
the government action. 
The Court in Bowers was asked to pass on the validity of Georgia's 
sodomy law. The law had been attacked as a violation of the right of 
privacy which had been declared a fundamental right almost twenty-
five years earlier in Griswold v. Connecticut, 136 where the Court struck 
down a law prohibiting the use of contraceptives. As indicated earlier, 
the term "fundamental rights," as used in constitutional jurispru-
dence, is more opaque than most. 137 The list of fundamental rights is, 
in fact, small. Many entries are familiar and can easily be linked to 
traditional forms of political malfunction.138 The right of privacy, 
however, is not so easily cabined. It remains the most controversial, 
most potentially expansive, and least understood fundamental right. 
Griswold is one of those cases that snotty law professors love to 
dissect, with its three concurring (and two dissenting) opinions locat-
ing the illusive right of privacy in various constitutional provisions 
ranging from the penumbras of the first, fourth, and fifth amendments 
to the ninth amendment to the basic tenets underlying the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Whatever the problems with 
these doctrinal rationales, however, it is the inability of the Court to 
define privacy, and the reasoning the various Justices used in attempt-
ing to do so, which gave rise to the strange logic of Bowers. In Gris-
wold, various Justices went on at length about the dangers to home 
and marriage from state interference with these traditional concepts. 
135. 106 s. Ct. 2841 (1986). 
136. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
137. See Part I supra. 
138. Voting, appellate procedure, and political association are concerns closely connected to 
the correction of political malfunction (especially minoritarian bias) discussed earlier. As we 
have seen, indigence is often present when a violation of fundamental rights triggers strict scru· 
tiny. 
The ill-defined fundamental right to travel can also be broken down into familiar compo· 
nents. The right to travel from one state to another seems consistent with a classic form of 
political malfunction - state action operating on citizens of other states who have no vote in the 
restricting state. Similar concerns about political malfunction underlie the commerce clause and 
privileges and immunities clause. See J. ELY, supra note 4, at 89-91. In other guises, this right to 
travel picks up the first amendment concerns about the protection of unpopular political posi· 
tions, see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), or judicial reaction to racial or wealth discrimina· 
tion. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 
U.S. 250 (1974). 
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From these vague ramblings in Griswold, it was easy to gather the 
notion that it was the prohibition of sexual and procreative activities 
of the most traditional sorts which should trigger judicial intervention. 
Here fundamental rights are truly linked to fundamentalness. The 
logic is simple - the more people who are seriously interfered with 
the more serious the interference. 
But that logic is not relevant to the central institutional issue -
the need for judicial protection. As the facts of Griswold show, such 
circumstances are precisely where judicial protection is not needed. 
No one was enforcing the law in Griswold. Those attacking the law 
had a devil of a time producing sufficient controversy to get standing 
and had failed on several occasions. This difficulty is perfectly consis-
tent with the most straightforward institutional analysis: A state's at-
tempt to interfere with activities which a vast majority consider 
important is likely to be dealt with quite well by the political process. 
That the Court should have expended so much effort on unneeded 
protection in Griswold was at worst silly in that context. When the 
Court in Bowers used the Griswold reasoning to justify a selectively 
enforced sodomy prohibition in Bowers, however, the result is much 
worse. Although the Georgia sodomy law does not explicitly single 
out homosexuals, it is homosexuals who justifiably fear the law. This 
select subgroup apparently was the only group at risk from enforce-
ment of the Georgia law. In both the courts and the media, Bowers 
was discussed primarily in terms of prohibition of a homosexual activ-
ity. More importantly, this narrow targeting of homosexuals made the 
Georgia law more acceptable to the Court in Bowers, with both the 
Court and the state of Georgia treating broader application of the stat-
ute as constitutionally suspect. 
A sodomy law which in practice interfered with intimate relations 
among married couples would interfere with the actions of more peo-
ple. But that sort of broad application would also make judicial pro-
tection less necessary: The more widespread and important the 
prohibited practice, the more likely that the prohibition will be re-
formed within the political process. The constitutional problem with 
the sodomy laws is that the real threat of enforcement is focused on a 
small group. Homosexuals can be singled out for enforcement without 
serious fear of political reaction. That makes judicial protection more 
important - not less. 
There are good grounds, in fact, to consider homosexuals a group 
in need of general judicial protection, like that accorded under strict 
scrutiny equal protection. Homosexuals have a great many of the 
characteristics of protected minorities. They are a discrete, easily de-
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fined group. Although immutability has been in issue, it is generally 
thought that sexual proclivity is a disposition established early in life 
(perhaps at birth) and unlikely to change. Homosexuals are often geo-
graphically insular. Sexual proclivity is another traditional subject 
which can easily generate a visceral response among the heterosexual 
majority. Certain religious groups have traditionally considered ho-
mosexuality a sin. These religious groups provide an organized sub-
group capable of informing and organizing the heterosexual majority. 
Although gays are vocal minorities in a few communities, they are 
certainly a small minority in most locales, in all states, and in the 
nation. 
The reluctance of the Supreme Court even to recognize the need to 
protect homosexuals seems difficult either to explain or to justify from 
an institutional standpoint. Whether one is sympathetic to homosexu-
ality or not, homosexuals are still a group which faces serious potential 
for majoritarian bias. In Bowers, the Court could have confined its 
protection of homosexuals to the issue of sexual conduct and even hid-
den it under the guise of the right of privacy. Instead, it rejected pro-
tection of sexual privacy in exactly the situation in which it was most 
needed. 
There are important societal issues where a prohibition severely 
impacts unconventional lifestyles and raises the possibility of 
majoritarian bias. It is possible to understand some of the Court's pri-
vacy decisions, as well as its protection of literary use of sexual images, 
as a reaction to such majoritarian bias (even though they may be ratio-
nalized under the rubric of fourteenth amendment fundamental rights 
or first amendment protection of expression). Minorities who suffer 
from this bias are often defined only by the particular unconventional 
lifestyle choice rather than by some more general and traditional mi-
nority classification. If because these minorities are not as easily de-
fined as traditional minorities the courts choose to rationalize their 
protection in terms of subject matter, then resulting semantic fictions, 
like fundamental rights, are arguably understandable and tolerable. 
But when courts and commentators distort the conceptions so that 
decisions about judicial protection no longer relate to the need for 
such protection, the fictions come at too high a cost. Lyrical discus-
sions of fundamentalness couched in terms of the search for self-fulfill-
ment or the tradition of the American home promote the sort of 
twisted reasoning found in Bowers. If the courts are going to use the 
notion of privacy to protect the conventional activities by those al-
ready able to protect themselves politically, they should drop the con-
cept now. At the least, it wastes precious resources; at the worst, it 
February 1988] A Job for the Judges 721 
adds to the problems of those unable to represent themselves in the 
political process. 
CONCLUSION 
Referring to the Allied victory in North Africa and its meaning to 
the prosecution of World War II, Winston Churchill allowed as how it 
was not the end, nor even the beginning of the end, but was perhaps 
the end of the beginning. In three articles, I have explored the need 
for comparative institutional analysis which realistically and sophisti-
catedly portrays the complexities of societal decisionmaking in general 
and of constitutional judicial review in particular. I have criticized 
those constitutional commentators who have failed to seriously con-
sider institutional features and those whose considerations were not 
comparative or sufficiently developed. In this article, I have presented 
an institutional analysis which I have found useful in understanding 
constitutional law, history, and commentary, and I have applied it to a 
wide range of these issues. 
I do not, however, believe that this is the last word on institutional 
analysis, let alone an encyclopedic review of all constitutional issues. 
Most of the task of constructing and improving the necessary analyti-
cal tools and employing them to understand constitutional law re-
mains to be done (if, in fact, such work can ever be completed). 
Characterizing and studying the various parts of what I have called 
the political process, exploring the troubling interaction between socie-
tal goals and institutional choice, and examining empirically all the 
assertions about forms of bias and resource constraints just begin the 
work list. This article is certainly not the end or even the beginning of 
the end of this work. 
Yet there is a beginning here which can be considered, criticized, 
and built upon. Institutional tools have been defined and a framework 
constructed. The analysis has been applied to constitutional decisions, 
historical moments, and commentary. These constructs and applica-
tions are admittedly subject to debate and change, but even in their 
present form they give judges and scholars something real to work 
with. They are better than the attractive but fictitious imagery of orig-
inal intent and the judicial search for overriding moral principles. 
Constitutional law cannot be divorced from institutional reality and, 
therefore, constitutional analysis ought not be divorced from institu-
tional analysis. That such analysis is difficult and even troubling can-
not be denied. But it also cannot be avoided. 
